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The tidal wave of democracy has yet to crash across the shores of Cuba primarily 
because the colossal persona of Fidel Castro has obstructed its path. What will happen 
when Castro is gone from the political scene? What forces, if any, exist on the Caribbean 
Island that would encourage change? Is the wave of democracy simply circling Cuba 
awaiting Castro's downfall or has Fidel created a breakwater that will keep his revolution 
alive well past his death? Castro's passing will undoubtedly bring about a leadership 
vacuum in Cuba that will thrust the island further along a transitional path, a path that 
began when Cuba lost its Soviet benefactor. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the transition path Cuba has been on since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union in four key arenas: political society, economic society, 
civil society, and the international arena. It will also determine if these alterations have 
helped pave the way for liberalization and a transition to democracy after Castro is gone. 
In short, this thesis argues that what occurs in Cuba before Castro dies will determine 
what happens after he dies. Recommendations for U.S. policy are made based on the 
findings in this thesis. 
v 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION •.......•...........•.•..•••••......•........•....•.•..............•......•.••••••.••••.••••.•••••••••••••••••.....•••..•••••.•..... 1 
A. TIfEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...................................................................................................... 2 
B. WHY POST CASTRO? ..................................................................................................................... 5 
C. TIfE POST·CASTRO CUBA ............................................................................................................. 6 
D. TIfESIS INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 8 
E. TIfESIS IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................................................ 10 
D. CUBAN POLITICAL SOCIETY ..•.•.••••.•.•..•.•...•.••••.••.••••••••••••••.••••.••.•....•...••...•.••••••••••••••••••.••••.••••••••• 11 
A. INTRODUCfION ............................................................................................................................ 11 
B. POLITICAL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY ................................................................................ 12 
C. POLITICAL PROCESS AND PARTICIPATION ........................................................................... 14 
D. TIfE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC) ............................................................................. ~ ... 16 
E. TIfE CUBAN ARMED FORCES (FAR) ......................................................................................... 19 
F. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH OF TIfE FAR ............................................................................... 24 
G. A UNIQUE COMMUNIST AND LATIN MILITARY ................................................................... 28 
H. AN AVENUE FOR CHANGE? ...................................................................................................... 31 
1. Masses .......................................................................................................................................... 31 
2. The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) ............................................................................................. 32 
3.. The Cuban Armed Forces ............................................................................................................. 32 
I. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 35 
m. ECONOMIC SOCIETY •..............••....•••.•...•.........•...•.••..•••.•••.....•••••••.•••..••••..•.••••••••..••••••••..••..•.••••..•.• 37 
A. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 37 
B. MARKET AND DEMOCRACY ..................................................................................................... 38 
C. TIfE CUBAN ECONOMY .............................................................................................................. 39 
D. CUBAN ECONOMIC REFORMS ................................................................................................... 41 
1. Fiscal Policy .................................................................................................................................. 41 
a. Budget Austerity ........................................................................................................................................ 42 
b. Taxation .................................................................................................................................................... .43 
c. Monetary Policy ........................................................................................................................................ 44 
d. Price ControL ............................................................................................................................................ 45 
2. Privatization .................................................................................................................................. 47 
a. Land ........................................................................................................................................................... 47 
b. Labor ........................................................................................................................................................ .49 
c. Industry ................................................................................................ , ..................................................... 52 
E. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT ..................................................... 52 
F. CREDIT ............................................................................................................................................ 54 
G. AN AVENUE FOR CHANGE? ....................................................................................................... 55 
1. Fiscal Reforms .............................................................................................................................. 56 
2. Privatization .................................................................................................................................. 57 
3. Trade Liberalization and Foreign Investment.. ............................................................................. 58 
4. Credit Market ................................................................................................................................ 58 
H. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 58 
IV. CIVll.. SOCIETY ••••..........••..•••.•••••...••..•••••.•..•......••..........•.•....••...•.•......•..•.••.•.•••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••.•.•. 61 
A. INTRODUCfION ............................................................................................................................ 61 
B. CIVIL SOCIETY, TRANSITION, AND DEMOCRACy ............................................................... 61 
C. TIfE STATE, LIBERALIZATION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CUBA ......................................... 63 
1. The State ....................................................................................................................................... 63 
2. Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) ............................................................... 64 
D. LIBERALIZATION ......................................................................................................................... 64 
1. Economic Liberalization ............................................................................................................... 65 
2. Political Liberalization .................................................................................................................. 66 
vii 
E. CIVll.. SOCIETY AND NGOS ........................................................................................................ 67 
F. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ............................................................................................................ 72 
G. THE PAPAL VISIT .......................................................................................................................... 74 
H. THE STATE RE-EMERGES ........................................................................................................... 76 
I. AN A VENUE FOR CHANGE? ....................................................................................................... 77 
1. Economic Liberalization ............................................................................................................... 78 
2. Political Liberalization .................................................................................................................. 78 
3. NGO Growth ................................................................................................................................ 79 
4. Masses .......................................................................................................................................... 79 
J. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................. 79 
V. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS .......................................................................................................... 81 
A. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 81 
B. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS, TRANSITION, AND DEMOCRACy ........................................ 81 
C. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS THE CUBAN HISTORICAL CASE ............................................ 83 
D. KEY INTERNATIONAL ACTORS ................................................................................................ 85 
1. The United States .......................................................................................................................... 86 
a. The Embargo ............................................................................................................................................. 86 
b. Policy Changes .......................................................................................................................................... 89 
c. U.S.-Cuban Relations in the International Arena ....................................................................................... 90 
2. Latin America ............................................................................................................................... 91 
3. Spain ............................................................................................................................................. 93 
4. Canada .......................................................................................................................................... 94 
5. The Catholic Church ..................................................................................................................... 95 
E. AN AVENUE FOR CHANGE? ....................................................................................................... 97 
1. Political Society ............................................................................................................................ 98 
2. Economic Society ......................................................................................................................... 99 
3. Civil Society ............................................................................................................................... 100 
F. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 100 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................... 101 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................ 101 
1. Political Society .......................................................................................................................... 102 
2. Economic Society ....................................................................................................................... 102 
3. Civil Society ............................................................................................................................... 103 
4. International Factors ................................................................................................................... 103 
B. TESTING THE THEORy .............................................................................................................. 104 
C. IT IS TIME TO COME IN FROM THE COLD: U.S. STRATEGY FOR CUBA IN THE NEW 
Mll..LENIUM ................................................................................................................................. 105 
D. POLICY OPTIONS ........................................................................................................................ 106 
E. RECOMMENDATION .................................................................................................................. 108 
1. Peaceful Transition ..................................................................................................................... 109 
2. Democratic Change Post-Castro ................................................................................................. 109 
BmLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... III 
INITIAL DISTRmUTION LIST ............................................................................................................ 121 
viii 
LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1.1 The interaction between political, economic, and civil society ..................................... 3 
Figure 1.2 The interaction between political, economic, and civil society, and the international 
arena. .............................................................................................................................. 3 
Table 2.1 Potential for Democratic Transition in a Post Castro Cuba: Political Society .............. 31 
Table 2.2 Military Expenditures, Military Expenditures (ME) as percent of Gross National 
Product (GNP), and personnel of the Cuban Military 1985-1995, odd years.* ........... 33 
Table 3.1 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Deficit from 1989-1997 (millions of pesos) ....... 47 
Table 3.2 Selected Prices at Agricultural Markets in Havana, 1994-1998 (in pesos/pound) ........ 49 
Table 3.3 Cuban Trade (in billions of pesos) and Joint Ventures (total) from 1989 to 1997 ........ 54 
Table 3.4 Potential for Democratic Transition in a Post-Castro Cuba: Cuban Economy ............. 56 
Table 4.1 Potential for Democratic Transition in a Post-Castro Cuba: Civil Society ................... 78 
Table 5.1 Amount of pledged and delivered investments in Cuba from selected areas since 1990 
(in millions of dollars.)* ................................................................................................ 95 
Table 5.2 Potential for Democratic Transition in a Post-Castro Cuba: International Factors ....... 98 
Table 6.1 Potential for Democratic Transition in a Post-Castro Cuba ........................................ 101 
Table 6.2 Comparison ofLinz and Stepan Implications of Prior Non-democratic Regime (post-
totalitarian) with Cuban Prospects for Democracy in Critical Arenas ......................... 104 
Table 6.3 Arguments for Lifting or Maintaining the U.S. Embargo of Cuba ............................. 107 
ix 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The tidal wave of democracy has yet to crash across the shores of Cuba primarily 
because the colossal persona of Fidel Castro has obstructed its path. Since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, there have been a seemingly infinite number of authors and politicians that 
have announced the inexorable passage of Castro from power. Yet, he remains 
entrenched; witness his reelection to another five-year term as president by the Cuban 
Council of State. l But what will happen when Castro is gone from the political scene? 
What forces, if any, exist on the Caribbean Island that would encourage change? Is the 
wave of democracy simply circling Cuba awaiting Castro's downfall or has Fidel created 
a breakwater that will keep his revolution alive well past his demise? Perhaps Castro's 
Cuba is unique in that he has created a situation, unlike China and Vietnam after the 
deaths of those countries' charismatic leaders, where his legacy and st~unch anti-
capitalist, policies will remain after his death. 
Castro has attempted to build institutions of control, such as the military, the 
Communist Party, and the political process that will carryon his revolution after his 
death. However, Castro's passing will undoubtedly bring about a leadership vacuum in 
Cuba that will thrust the island further along a transitional path, a path that began when 
Cuba lost its Soviet benefactor. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the transition path 
Cuba has been on since the collapse of the Soviet Union in four key arenas: political 
society, economic society, civil society, and the international arena. 2 It will also 
determine if these alterations have helped pave the way for liberalization and a transition 
1 "Castro and His Top Aides Are Re-Elected," Reuters, 25 February 1998. 
2 The focus on these arenas is from Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996),3-15. Linz and Stepan fail to emphasize international factors 
in transition but they should. International factors have a particularly important role in Cuba. 
to democracy after Castro is gone. In short, this thesis argues that what occurs in Cuba 
before Castro dies will determine what happens after he dies. 
Before exploring the elements that will determine a transition to democracy in 
Cuba, several factors will be discussed: the relationship between democracy and political 
society, economic society, civil society, and the international arena; the reasons transition 
cannot occur with Castro in power; and the most likely scenario in Cuba after Fidel's 
demise. 
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual basis ofthis thesis stems from Juan J. Linz's and Alfred Stepan's 
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America 
and Post-Communist Europe. In their work, the authors discuss the importance of five 
essential arenas of democracy of which political society, economic society, and civil 
society are included.3 They emphasize the key role that these arenas play in determining 
a country's transition from a non-democratic society to a democratic one and test their 
theory on Southern Europe in the 1970s, Latin America in the 1980s, and Post-
Communist Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The authors further emphasize that 
democracy is "an interacting system. No single arena in such a system can function 
properly without some support from one or all of the other arenas.,,4 In essence, political, 
economic, and civil societies support and counteract one another in determining a 
transition from a non-democratic regime. Figure I depicts this relationship. 
3 Ibid. The other arenas include rule ofJaw and the state apparatus. While the authors' major 
argument is focused on consolidated democracies, these arenas provide an important area of study in the 
transition to democracy. 








Figure 1.1 The interaction between political, economic, and civil society. 
In addition to the framework set out by Linz and Stepan, international factors will 
also have an effect on the Cuban transition, although somewhat less expectantly than the 







Figure 1.2 The interaction between political, economic, and civil society, and the 
international arena. 
To picture Cuba's position currently would be to see a very large political society 
pressuring a small economic society and an even smaller civil society with international 
players attempting to affect all arenas. Fidel and Raul Castro's departure will 
dramatically change the balance of power within Cuba and a new equilibrium will have 
to be established amongst emerging powers from political, economic, civil, and 
international arenas. The hypothesis presented in this thesis is that the emerging groups 
3 
from Cuba's economic and civil societies, supported by external international factors, 
will challenge the dominant political society. These groups could emerge from Cuba's 
entrepreneurs or from Non-Governmental organizations (NGOs) that will likely obtain 
more political and economic freedom after Castro is gone. The organizations will grow 
in stature, shrinking political society's influence, and possibly pave the way for 
liberalization and democratic transition. Economic society will potentially have a greater 
role to play in Cuba because of the realities of today' s financially interdependent world. 
Linz and Stepan also highlight the importance sovereignty and the development 
of a nation has on democratic transition. They argue that democracy cannot exist without 
a state. S Here, Cuba has an advantage in two distinct ways. First, Cuba and Cubans are a 
generally homogeneous society. Cubans speak the same language, have a similar 
historical heritage and generally identify with Cuba as a nation-state. The second 
advantage is the impact Castro and his revolution have had on Cuba. Before Castro, 
Cuban history was dominated by foreign influence. And while the Soviets exerted 
influence with Castro, they certainly did not wield enough power to seriously affect 
Cuban policy. Evidence of Castro's ability to create sovereignty and a nation are even 
greater today because of the collapse of communism. Castro has always been much more 
a nationalist leader and savvy politician than he was ever a communist. Cuba is clearly 
sovereign. 
Throughout this paper, elements of liberalization in political, economic, civil, and 
international arenas will be identified because liberalization has been the precursor to 
democratic transition. As Guillermo O'Donnell points out, " ... the process of 
S Linz and Stepan, 16-37. 
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liberalization seems almost invariably to precede or lead democratization. Since it does 
not directly and immediately involve the transfer or surrender of power, the risks to 
established interests ofliberalization are significantly less than of democratization."6 
B. WHY POST CASTRO? 
Put into1990s terms, Fidel is the man! He is a true caudillo and has become an 
institution himself in Cuba. He controls every mechanism of the state apparatus: he is 
President of the Republic, President of the Council of State, President of the Council of 
Ministers, Secretary General of the Communist Party, and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces. He has shown an uncanny ability to remain in power in the face of 
insurrections, assassination attempts, an economic embargo, the loss of a benefactor, and 
a deep economic crisis. How has he done it? Some would argue through cold-blooded 
repression. Others would say through extraordinary statesmanship. However, few would 
attribute his success to luck. Castro has used a variety of tools, including statesmanship 
and repression, to ensconce himself in power. He has expertly manipulated Cuba's 
internal and external political landscape to release and tighten pressure on Cuba to 
maintain power - Castro's ultimate raison d' etre. The fact that he remains in charge of 
Cuba today is testament to his ability to keep Cuba in a state ofinertia. The point of 
emphasis is that because of Fidel 's actions, Cuba is unable to create the means to support 
democracy and will remain unable to do so until he, and probably Raul Castro as well, 
has departed the Cuban landscape. Thus, this thesis assumes that both Castros will have 
left the Cuban political scene before a successful transition to democracy. 
6 Guillenno O'Donnell, "Introduction to the Latin American Cases," in Phillippe C. Schmitter and 
Guillenno O'Donnell eds., Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 8. 
5 
C. THE POST-CASTRO CUBA 
There are three primary political camps in Cuba: Hard liners (Duros) led by Fidel 
Castro; Centrists (Centristas) headed by Raul Castro, and backed by the Cuban Armed 
Forces (FAR); and Reformers (Reformistas) who are guided by Foreign Minister Roberto 
Robaina, Vice President of the Council of State and economic czar Carlos Lage (though 
there is some evidence that Lage has moved to the Centrist camp), and Minister of the 
Economy Jose Luis Rodriguez.? 
Those in the hard-line camp are opposed to restructuring the Cuban economy and 
have very staunch views regarding internal and external security. The Centrists have 
been primarily responsible for recent economic changes on the island, but maintain a 
strong view concerning security. The Reformers appear to challenge the notion of a 
closed economy and are aware of the effectiveness of a mixed economy. The Centrists, 
with support from the Reformers, have been in charge of planning and implementing the 
changes in the economy that have been underway since the onset of the Cuban economic 
crisis or "The Special Period in Time of Peace," the term Cuban officials have used since 
1991 in reference to their economic crisis. 
The Centristas are in the best position to assume power after Castro mostly 
because of their increased influence in present-day Cuba. Additionally, as the center, 
they have excellent opportunities to forge alliances with both Duros and Reformistas in a 
transition. 
The best examples of the increased influence of the Centrists can be viewed 
through the market reforms that Cuba has undertaken since 1991, and from Raul Castro's 
1 The best discussion of these camps is available in Edward Gonzales, Cuba: Clearing Perilous 
Waters? (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996). ix, 40-43. 
6 
elevated prestige. Much of the credit for the economic refOIms has gone to Raul, Fidel's 
younger brother. The latter officially named the former as his eventual successor at the 
fifth party congress in October 1997; a fact not to be understated as it has taken nearly 40 
years for Fidel to actually do this. Further, Raul has taken on a more prominent role in 
running the Communist Party. He visited China in November 1997 to acquaint himself 
with economic changes there and stopped in Rome to organize the Papal visit to Cuba, 
which occurred in January 1998.8 
Vastly different scenarios have been developed to describe post-Castro Cuba. 
These have ranged from the leader's retirement, to violent insurrection, to Castro's death. 
Clearly, there will be a power vacuum when Fidel is gone. Some authors argue that a 
coalition of elite forces will assume power: 
Already the regime has followed a pattern of the newly industrialized 
countries (NICs) in creating a cadre of technical and professional 
personnel who have mastered the science of organization and 
management. An alliance of technocrats, military personnel, and 
foreign interests looks very much like a recipe for authoritarianism of 
the 1970s Latin America. 9 
Others argue that the military will have to hold the country together through the 
transition, arguing for its prominence over the party and the communist system: 
1998. 
Unlike Cuba's communist Party whose legitimacy has eroded because 
of the worldwide collapse of communism and the island's severe 
economic crisis, the FAR now has emerged as the most powerful 
institution in Cuba today. The FAR possesses not only the weapons 
but also the organization, command structure, and leadership skills 
needed to take over in a crisis situation. 10 
8 Larry Rohter, "Castro's Brother Takes Bigger Role in Cuba," The New York Times, 2 February 
9 Miguel Angel Centeno, "Cuba's Search for Alternatives" in Toward a New Cuba? Legacies of a 
Revolution ed. Miguel Angel Centeno and Mauricio Font (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1997), 19. 
10 Edward Gonzales, Cuba's Dismal Post-Castro Futures (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), 13. 
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The void is most likely to be filled by civilian and military elites, the leaders of 
the key remaining institutions in Cuba - the Cuban Military and the Cuban Communist 
Party - who will likely share power through the transition. 11 
D. THESIS INTRODUCTION 
Each chapter in this thesis initially explores democratic transition theory on each 
of the essential arenas studied: political society, economic society, civil society, and the 
international arena. The Cuban case study for each arena is then presented. Theory and 
fact are then married to view what, if any, avenues for change exist in Cuba. Finally, 
each chapter summarizes factors that support and impede liberalization in Cuba and what 
implications for democratization can be inferred from these factors. 
Chapter II investigates Cuban political society and the key elements that will 
remain after Castro: the military, the Communist Party, and mass involvement in the 
political system. Second only to Castro, the Cuban Armed Forces are the strongest 
institution in Cuba and will be the pivotal organization to contribute any kind of change 
in Cuba. They seem to be able to accept civilian leadership and the civilian leadership 
has recognized the military's overall competence. This mutual acceptance and 
recognition can contribute toward a democratic transition. 
The Cuban Communist Party (PCC) will also playa significant role in 
determining the post-Castro Cuba. Its functionaries and leaders maintain much of the 
bureaucratic and political power in Cuba. Because of this control, it is likely that a 
11 Gonzalez, Cuba: Clearing Perilous Waters, 107-119. Gonzales discusses four possibilities for 
filling the void. In the first scenario, the regime muddles through. In the second scenario, he discusses 
heightened authoritarianism and stasis. In the third scenario, Gonzales opines non-violent change and 
power sharing. In the fourth scenario, he sees violent system change. I have combined aspects of the 
regime muddling through and a power sharing system between the civilian and military because I believe 
this is the most likely scenario after Castro. 
8 
member from the party will be chosen to help lead the country after Castro. To its credit, 
the party has continually sought to rejuvenate itself in various ways since its inception. 
However, the party is riddled with hard-line communists who have vested interests in 
remaining in power. Overall, the PCC will likely be the greatest impediment to 
democratic change in Cuba. 
Chapter III explores the Cuban economy and the significant changes which have 
occurred since the loss of Cuba's Soviet benefactor. Since 1993, Cuba has enacted fiscal 
reforms which have set the country on an irreversible course toward a market-oriented 
economy. Cuba has embarked on an austere fiscal policy similar to an International 
Monetary Fund prescription whereby they have laid off numerous state employees, begun 
a privatization program, opened the economy to international market forces, and explored 
ways of restructuring their debt. Privatization in land, labor, and industry, though 
limited, is gaining. Cuba has dramatically increased its integration into a world economy 
and is being influenced by Western, market-oriented democracies. This situation 
portends a shift toward a market economy which in tum will aid in a shift to democracy. 
Cuban civil society is analyzed in Chapter IV. Although civil society lacks 
institutional strength, it has recently strengthened and will play an important role in a 
transition to democracy. On the one hand, Cuban NGOs have grown dramatically since 
the fall ofthe Soviet Union. On the other hand, Castro has been extremely effective at 
fragmenting and controlling any movements that have been pro-democracy. While the 
Cuban people have made tremendous strides toward creating a civil society, that society 
is clearly in its infancy and must grow and receive tremendous support from internal and 
external sources if it is to be a factor in Cuban democratization. 
9 
Chapter V examines the international factors that will affect the Cuban transition, 
with emphasis on the U.S. role. International players have historically played a strong 
role in Cuba and will continue to do so after Castro's demise. While international forces 
cannot be the principal instruments of democratic change in Cuba, they can provide a 
guide for the political, economic, and civil society actors within Cuba that will affect 
change after Castro. In today's interdependent political and economic world, 
international forces, and specifically the United States, are sure to play an important role 
in democratizing Cuba after Castro. 
E. THESIS IMPLICATIONS 
. This thesis addresses three points. First, it evaluates contemporary Cuba within 
the context of Linz and Stepan and shows their theory to be effective in determining 
potential for democratic transition and consolidation. Highlighting the international 
influence on transition also bolsters the Linz and Stepan theory. Second, the thesis 
presented here can be applied to other countries, such as North Korea or those in Africa, 
as a model to determine transition paths. Third, this thesis draws clear implications for 
U.S. policy toward Cuba. 
10 
II. CUBAN POLITICAL SOCIETY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Political society can be defined as "that arena in which the polity specifically 
arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power.m2 
Key elements that make up any polity include the "political institutions, both input 
(political parties, interest groups, mass media), and output (legislatures, executives, 
bureaucracies, courts); the specific incumbents of those institutions; and the nation."13 In 
many countries, the elements of political society are numerous and various individuals 
and groups have influence. In Cuba, however, Fidel Castro dominates political society. 
But what institutions in Cuba will survive him? How will they interact to determine 
Cuba's political organization after Castro? Will they maintain status quo or will they 
succumb to the forces of democracy? 
Aside from the institution of Fidel Castro himself, the key elements of political 
society within Cuba are the Cuban Armed Forces (FAR), the Cuban Communist Party 
(PCC), and the existing political system and its participatory process. This chapter will 
examine the role these three elements have played in Cuban political society, the impact 
of Cuba's transition on these groups, the role they might play in a post-Castro Cuba, and 
whether they will impede or support democratic transition. A majority ofthis chapter is 
devoted to the Cuban military because of its anticipated preeminence after Castro. Prior 
to exploring the FAR, the PCC, and the Cuban political system, a framework for 
understanding political society and its role in transition is necessary. 
12 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 8. 
13 Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy," in Larry Diamond, ed. 
Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries. (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994), 8. 
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B. POLITICAL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY 
The question of how transition occurs from non-democratic to democratic society 
has received tremendous attention in recent years as democracy enveloped Southern 
Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa. Various authors offer a wide array 
of theories on how and why change occurs.14 Some believe that the political culture and 
historic culture of a country can determine the outcome of post-authoritarian rule. Others 
insist that leading individuals in various institutions must make some sort of pact to allow 
transition to occur. Most believe that varied requirements must be met in each country to 
help inculcate democratic ideals before a completed transition. These requirements 
include the actions of the elite, political culture, mass influence, and the capacity for 
change within political society actors and institutions. 
Elites are persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful 
organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. They are 
"the principal decision makers in the largest or most resource-rich political, 
governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, and cultural 
organizations and movements in a society. "IS Elites make or support democratic 
transition because they "come to conclude that democratic change is a good thing in and 
of itself, or that it is necessary to achieve other ends they value (such as domestic stability 
and peace, or international acceptance).,,16 In Cuba, the elites are Fidel and Raul Castro, 
14 An introductory list could include the five part Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe C. Schmitter, and 
Laurence Whitehead eds., Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986); Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation; Larry Diamond, 
Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences 
with Democracy (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994); and John Higley and Richard Gunther. Elites 
and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992). 
IS Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, 8. 
16 Diamond, "Causes and Effects," in Political Culture and Democracy, 239. 
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the members ofthe Politburo ofthe PCC, and the leadership of the FAR. 
Political culture can be defined as "a people's predominant beliefs, attitudes, 
values, ideals, sentiments, and evaluations about the political system of its country ... .'>17 
Political culture helps to shape ideals of both elites and masses and both of these groups 
can have an effect on democratization. Elites typically have distinctive values, norms, 
greater access to information and influence, and often lead the way in making change. 18 
However, values and norms ofthe populace also have an effect on change: "at the mass 
level, democratization can be stimulated both by cultural change and by the resurgence of 
long submerged cultural beliefs and styles."19 
Two essential elements help to combine political culture with elites and their 
institutions if democratic transition is to occur; mass participation, and pragmatism. 
Mass participation is important because it "is another central element ofthe ideal-typical 
mass democratic culture."20 Institutional and individual pragmatism is important to 
democracy because "pragmatism generates flexible goals, and it is consistent with a 
commitment to democratic procedural norms."21 
The theory presented here supposes that powerful institutions and their leaders 
(elites) must make a decision to make a change in the ruling status quo. These elites are 
either pushed or supported by various elements within the political society. These 
elements include political culture, the political process, citizen participation, and 
institutional pragmatism. In democratic transitions, these elements combine to liberalize 
17 Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy," 7. 
18 Ibid., 8. 
19 Diamond, "Causes and Effects,", 240. 
20 Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy," 13. 
21 Ibid., 11. 
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a political society and move it foward democracy. 
Because the Castro brothers represent and control so much of political landscape, 
their departure from the scene will virtually force the remaining players into a decision-
making process that will detennine Cuba's future. 
C. POLITICAL PROCESS AND PARTICIPATION 
The Cuban governmental process is anchored in socialist bureaucracy. There are 
three levels of government: a national level, a provincial level with 14 provinces (and one 
special municipality in Havana), and a municipal level existing of 169 municipalities. 
The system is centered on the Organs of Popular Power, which have existed at the 
provincial and municipal levels since 1976 and were originally intended to provide 
decentralization.22 
Each municipality is divided into electoral districts that nominate candidates at 
neighborhood meetings and elect delegates from among them for a two and a half-year 
term. The candidates are then directly elected as delegates to the municipal assemblies. 
The number of assembly members for a given municipality is based on population and 
territory. Delegates to the municipal assemblies are subject to immediate recall by their 
electors at any time and are required to report to their constituencies every six months.23 
Municipal elections are the starting point for Cuba's electoral system and are 
organized in three stages. During the first, neighborhood assemblies choose candidates 
for the delegate positions for each precinct, ranging from two to eight persons. During 
the second, biographical infonnation about the candidate, which is prepared by 
22 Sheryl L. Lutjens, "Decentralization in Cuba," in Cuban Studies 26, ed. Jorge I. Dominguez 
(Pittsbur~: University of Pittsburgh Press: 1996), 12. 
3 Stanley Malinowitz, "Services and the Cuban Municipal Economy," in Cuba Studies 27 ed. 
Jorge F. Perez Lopez (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997),70. 
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communist party functionaries, is posted in public places. In the third, secret and direct 
voting occurs with suffrage for all citizens over 16 years old. Turnout is very high and 
citizens seemingly respect the political process.24 According to current rules, no 
organization can campaign for any candidate, nor can any candidate or their supporters 
organize an election campaign. The electoral commission organizes the entire process; 
however, the commission is organized under the Pcc. There is evidence, though, that 
party officials do not interfere with the voting procedures. 25 
Changes in the electoral process occurred in 1992, with the new Cuban 
Constitution granting two important reforms. First, the populace began to directly elect 
representatives to the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP). Before that, the 
Municipal Assembly members, following their election, selected provincial and national 
representatives.26 
Second, Popular Councils (CPs) were instituted. CPs are a territorial unit within 
the municipal level of government in Cuba's political system. They are designed to 
increase efficiency in production and services in the economic, educational, and cultural 
sectors of their local areas. CPs do not function as an autonomous political entity and 
their functions are still coordinated through meetings with council presidents which high-
level party officials typically attend. CPs have afforded the Cuban citizenry greater 
24 For example, in 1995,97.1 percent of the population voted and only 11.3 percent of the ballots 
were left blank or spoiled. See Lutjens, "Decentralization in Cuba," 18,. 
2S Heroldo Dilla Alfonso, Gerardo Gonzalez and Ana T. Vincentelli, "Cuba's Local Governments: 
An Experience Beyond the Paradigms," in Cuba Studies 22 ed. Jorge I. Dominguez (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 153. 
26 Nelson Amaro, "Decentralization, Local Government, and Citizen Participation in Cuba. " 
Cuba in Transition, Proceedings of the Annual Meetings of the Associationfor the Study of the Cuban 
Economy (ASCE) 1996. Available [Online] <http://www.lanic.utexas.edu/lafcb!cuba/ascei>[31 January 
1998],269. 
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access to the local governmental process. By 1995 there were 1,551 CPs covering over 
90 percent of the population.27 
The overall electoral process with its direct elections and the citizen's ability to 
recall representatives appears to be a resounding example of popular, democratic process. 
The initiation of the CPs and direct elections for the National Assembly were important 
changes in Cuba's electoral process. They signified an increase in power to the average 
citizen and showed that Cuba's political process appears to represent the people. Clearly, 
mass participation, an essential element in democracy, exists in Cuba. However, 
candidates are still screened and accepted or denied by the communist party; political 
opposition not only doesn't exist, it is illegal; and the National Assembly is not well-
empowered, typically acting as a rubber stamp for the Politburo. There is simply no loyal 
opposition to the current regime and little substantial ability for the population of Cuba to 
affect change, democratic or otherwise. 
D. THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC) 
In 1959, the communist Party of Cuba operated under the name of the Popular 
Socialist Party (PSP) and was essentially directed by Raul Castro. It was not until 1961, 
two years after the successful revolution of Fidel Castro, that the process of building a 
ruling party actually began. Initially, members ofthe PSP dominated the ruling party; 
however, a plot to overthrow Fidel Castro was uncovered and subversives in the party 
were purged in 1962. After the purge, the ruling organization became known as the 
United Party of Cuban Socialist Revolution (PURSC). The PURSC lasted until 1965 
27 See Lutjens, "Decentralization in Cuba", 19, and Amaro, "Decentralization, Local Government 
and Citizen Participation," 271. 
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when the current Cuban CommUnist Party (PCC) was formed. 28 Since then, the Castro 
brothers and their hand-selected deputies have commanded the PCC. 
From 1965 to the mid-1980s, the PCC and its powerful decision making body, the 
Politburo, were essentially stable organizations. However, beginning with Cuba's Third 
Party Congress in 1986, the PCC and its leadership have undergone dramatic turnover 
and had to deal with a great deal of scandal. The PCC remains ensconced in power only 
because it is the instrument of Castro; it is simply his puppet. 
The first significant change in personnel came in 1986 when four of the 15 
members of the Politburo lost their posts. By the end of the fourth Party Congress in 
October 1991, six more of 14 Politburo members lost their positions, and the Politburo 
was increased to 26 people. In the 1997 congress, there was a turnover of seven of 26 
Politburo members. No members of the Politburo were dropped from 1965-1986, but 
after the 1986 and 1991 congress only five of the living members from the 1965 Politburo 
remained. 29 
Also noteworthy in this turnover has been the replacement of older individuals 
with younger ones. For example in 1991, eleven of the 25 members of the Political 
Bureau were new members, and the oldest was 49 years old. 30 There seemed to be a 
concern about the youth movement in Cuba. 
28 Humberto Leon, "Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces 
(FAR)," in The Military and Transition in Cuba: Reference Guide for Policy and Crisis Management, 
International Research 2000 Inc. (Department of Defense, March 17, 1995), III-6-13. 
29 Jorge I. Dominguez, "Leadership Strategies and Mass Support: Cuban Politics before and after 
the 1991 Communist Party Congress," in Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth 
Party Congress ed. Jorge F. Perez Lopez, (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1994),2-3. Also see 
"Cuba Replaces Some Officials from Castro's generation with Young Men," Associated Press, October 14, 
1997. 
30 Dominguez, "Leadership Strategies and Mass Support," 6. 
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In addition to the shakeup of the party elite, scandal rocked the PCC throughout 
the late 1980s, mostly centered around the drug scandal which incriminated prominent I 
Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINF AR) and Ministry of Interior 
(MININT) personnel (the Ochoa affair, which I will discuss later). Besides the Ochoa 
affair, Vice-president Diocles Torralba and Luis Orlando Dominguez, former General 
Secretary of the Communist Youth Union, were arrested and imprisoned for corruption. 
The defection of brigade general Rafael del Pino also embarrassed the party.31 
Two theories have been formed to explain this abrupt change in the PCC. One, 
expressed by Jorge I. Dominguez, supposes that Cuba's political regime has become 
more personalized. 
Its institutions, especially the Communist Party and the mass 
organizations, have lost prestige, authority, and the effectiveness. 
Moreover, many top political conference who founded the regime and 
governed for decades have been dismissed from office or lost much of 
their power. To a degree unparalleled since the regimes founding, 
Fidel Castro's personal role is paramount.32 
The second, espoused by Juan M. del Aguila, supposes that the changes in the 
PCC were to keep it from going adrift and decaying like its cousins had in the Soviet 
Bloc. The party was going to look beyond corrupt party cadres and search for those who 
were openly or privately expressing sympathy with the reforms sweeping the communist 
world. Del Aguila's contention is not that everyone removed from the party was a 
reformer, but "the removal of key individuals preempted the consolidation of an anti-
regime faction.'>33 
31 Ibid., 2-3. 
32 Ibid., 1. 
33 Juan M. del Aguila, "The Party, the Fourth Congress, and the Process of Counterreform," in 
Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth Party Congress ed. Jorge F. Perez Lopez, 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1994),22. 
18 
The reasons the major shift occurred at the top of the PCC are not as important as 
the results. Scandals and tremendous turnover have further personalized Castro, stymied 
dissent, and undermined the stability of the PCC as an institution. 
In general, the PCC as a political body has modest institutional strength and 
authority. It clearly has an important role in Fidel Castro's successful revolution. It is 
Castro's primary means of controlling the rest of political society, and indeed the rest of 
the political process in Cuba. The PCC sets and implements policy and seems to have 
control over the military. The fact that the only internal attempts to topple Fidel have 
come from within the PCC, coupled with Castro's keen understanding that any challenge 
to him must come from within the PCC, makes it unlikely that Fidel will ever allow the 
PCC to be a true trusted agent. Castro knows too well where his enemies can gain power 
and has continually initiated change and renewal in the party and its elites to maintain 
domination. Despite the fact that the party has often been revitalized with younger 
members, this has always been from the top down. Because of this, the PCC has not been 
able to truly establish any sense of autonomy or develop unique leaders and will likely 
fall into crisis after the Castros are gone. The party does not seem to be viable platform 
of change. 
E. THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES (FAR) 
The Cuban Armed Forces have a much different history than the political process 
and the Communist Party in Cuba. The Cuban military has been an essential component 
of Cuba and Castroism since Fidel's time in the Sierra Maestras. The FAR helped 
achieve the greatest triumphs in Castro's history over Fulgenica Batista and against the 
United States in the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The military has been rooted as a part of the 
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Cuban community and sees itself as a main element trying to preserve the tenets and 
gains of the Cuban Revolution. As an institution, the Cuban military has made great 
efforts to maintain a high degree of professionalism and integrity. Jose F. Alfonso notes 
that "the military'S commitments to preserve the integrity of the Cuban nation, the 
achievement of the Revolution, and the role of their institution as the people's army are 
all believed to be deep seeded and unambiguous.,,34 
There are generally two roles that a military fulfills, external and internal 
security. The FAR; however, progressed beyond those basic missions and has enrolled 
into two others, an internationalist mission and an economic/civic mission. 
The primary mission of the FAR is to protect Cuba's national borders and to 
preserve the revolution. Cuba's primary threat comes from the United States in the form 
of U.S. military intervention or infiltration by exiles. The FAR employs various 
traditional and non-traditional warfighting capabilities including the "War of All the 
People" doctrine. This strategy is defensive in nature and envisions an armed populace 
willing to fight for the defense of Cuba. The MINF AR includes ground forces, 
Revolutionary Navy (MGR), Air and Air Defense Force (DAAF AR), Territorial Troop 
Militia (MTT), and Youth Labor Army (EJT).3S 
The FAR continues to carry out defense exercises that include civilians, 
reservists, and regular troops despite economic constraints. This points to external 
defense as a priority of the FAR: "these exercises appear to serve the dual purpose of 
34 Jose F. Alfonso, "Cuba's Anned Forces New Roles: Soldiers, Producers and Consumers," in 
The Military and Transition in Cuba: Reference Guide for Policy and Crisis Management, International 
Research 2000 Inc. (Department of Defense, March 17, 1995),11·1·2. 
35 Cuban Armed Forces Review. "Military doctrine," 1997·1998. 
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supporting cooperation and coordination between military units and the civilian 
population as well as reinforcing the potential for the imminence ofa U.S. invasion."36 
The forces of the MININT carry out internal defense. The wide-ranging tasks 
include surveillance, police action, counterintelligence, riot control, counternarcotics, and 
some would include repression and coercion. The MININT forces include State Security 
(DSE), Border Guards (TGF), Revolutionary National Police (PNR), the special battalion 
of police, and special troops. MININT has approximately 32,000 personneV7 Although 
the FAR has ostensible charge of the MININT, it must be emphasized that the FAR has 
not played a role in maintaining domestic control. In fact, a challenge to the FAR is to 
remain outside the realm of internal security. 
Many militaries have had national defense and internal order as their chief 
responsibilities. However, especially compared to countries the size of Cuba, few have 
taken on a mission outside of its borders to the level that the FAR has. The 
internationalist mission began as early as 1963 when Cuban units were sent to Algeria for 
support in a border conflict with Morocco. In 1966, troops were dispatched to present-
day Brazzaville, where Cuban support lasted for nearly 25 years. The level of the 
internationalist movement escalated exponentially in the 1970s when Castro ordered his 
forces to Ethiopia and Angola. In the 1980s, Cuban forces were involved overtly or 
covertly in Grenada, Suriname, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Colombia.38 
36 Phyllis Greene Walker, "Challenges Facing the Cuban Military." The Georgetown University 
Caribbean Project's Cuba Briefing Paper Series (Number 12, Oct 1996). Available [Online] 
<http://www.georget.own.edu!sfs/prograrns/clas!Caribe/cbps.htm>[31 January 1998], 9. 
37 Cuban Armed Forces Review, "Interior Ministry." 
38 Richard L Millett, "Cuba's Anned Forces: From Triumph to Survival." The Georgetown 
University Caribbean Project's Cuba Briefing Paper Series (Number 4, Sep 1993). Available [Online] 
<http://www .georgctown.edu/sfs/programs/clas!Caribe/cbps.htrn>[28 February 1998], 5. 
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The extraterritorial function became very important in military circles and superb 
performance in these missions began to lead to advancement. The role helped establish 
great confidence in the military institution because of their successes against the Somalis 
in Ethiopia and both U.s.-supported insurgents and regular units of South Africa in 
Angola. While the Soviets supported the Cuban operations logistically, Cuban 
commanders proved tactically efficiene9 The internationalist mission ended with the last 
troops returning from Angola in 1991, but while a part of FAR policy (1963-1991) more 
than 300,000 Cubans carried out military service abroad.40 
The FAR's scope in the Cuban economy, which really has roots in its 
representation as a revolutionary civic-minded institution, has gained great import since 
the withdrawal of fonner Soviet forces, and, in particular, Soviet financial backing. All 
along, Fidel Castro has recognized the importance of the economic role of the military: "I 
believe that one ofthe missions of the Armed Forces at this time is to help the economy. 
They are helping with the Youth Labor Army [EJT].,,41 
While the economic mission of the FAR now involves self-sufficiency and a great 
deal of incorporation in the society, it actually was conceived as a moneymaking 
institution in the mid-1980s. In 1986, Raul Castro authorized 17 MINF AR companies to 
operate semi-autonomously. The MINF AR firms, which were exempt from 
revolutionary labor laws prohibiting firms from laying off workers, rapidly trimmed their 
work forces and became more productive.42 In addition, in the mid-1980s, a group of 
39 Ibid. 
40 Walker, "Challenges Facing the Cuban Military,"S. 
41 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Latin America: Daily Report, 20 March 1991, 8. 
42 Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour: The Secret Story Behind the Coming downfall of 
Communist Cuba (New York: Touchstone, 1992),300. 
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military officials was tasked to develop recommendations for increasing productivity at 
various enterprises managed by the FAR. The group emphasized greater managerial 
autonomy and worker participation in decision-making, improved quality control, and a 
reduced work force. In addition, job performance, as opposed to seniority, was 
recommended as one of the primary criteria for promotion.43 
The FAR is heavily involved in the agricultural, manufacturing, and service 
sectors ofthe Cuban Economy. Their involvement in harvesting sugar cane dates back to 
the 1960s but they have also been working in other ·areas of agriculture. This stems from 
a requirement of self-sufficiency, whereby troops simply grow their own food to decrease 
the burden ofthe public sector on the military budget. 
The primary and most successful area in which the FAR has been involved has 
been in the tourism industry, which has become an increasingly important source of hard 
currency for Cuba. The most important establishment has been that of Gaviota Tourism 
Group, S.A. Through this corporation, the military became a leader in joint ventures that 
developed tourist hotels and resorts throughout the island. Gaviota runs the 
transportation corporation on the island and populates it with reserve DAAF AR pilots. 
The FAR even has a construction company, Union de Empresas Constructores, which 
has been involved in creating some ofthe joint-venture hotels and other tourist-related 
buildings. General Julio Casas Reguiero, the former chief of the DAAFAR and a 
Politburo member, runs Gaviota. By 1994, Gaviota reportedly had an annual income of 
some $220 million, an amount that represented nearly 15 percent of the country's total 
hard currency earnings for that year.44 
43 Walker, "Challenges Facing the Cuban Military," 6-7. 
44 Ibid., 7. 
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The success of the tourism industry has launched subsidiary.firms. Phyllis 
Greene Walker notes that "Texnotec, one of the recently established companies, is 
dedicated to importing information technology and electronic equipment; another, 
Turcimex, is a messenger and cargo company. Perhaps the most unusual venture in 
which the FAR is now said to be participating is TRD Caribe, a fast-growing chain of 
department stores.45 
The economic mission has been well supported in the higher levels of the 
military, and the FAR has been rather successful in incorporating western-style business 
practices and achieving profits. Again, Walker has essential data: 
By the end of 1994, the FAR had managed to keep its expenditures 
beneath its budgeted allocation, which reportedly allowed the regime to 
redirect the difference to programs in health and education. A year 
later, the FAR's leadership reported that it "self-financed" some 30 
percent of its expenses and reduced its 1996 burden on the national 
budget to 70 I mil1io~esos, a drop of 5 percent over the preceding 
year's funding level. 
F. INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTH OF THE FAR 
While the PCC has been weakened as an institution in Cuba's ongoing transition, 
the FAR has been able to adapt and consolidate its role as the preeminent institution 
behind the Castros. Six factors can be pointed to that help to legitimize the power of the 
FAR: favoritism by Fidel and Raul Castro; the relationship with the Cuban Communist 
Party (PCC); the consolidation of power over the MININT following the Ochoa affair; 
the role as a citizen soldier; professionalism; and the ability to adapt 
The first component of the FAR's strength is that the leadership of Cuba, i.e., 
Fidel and Raul, are partial to the FAR. Both men were key leaders of the revolutionary 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 8. 
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militias and maintain representation in the military: Fidel is El Commandante and Raul is 
the Minister of Defense. A simple yet important anecdote of this favoritism is shown by 
Fidel continually wearing his military uniform (although when abroad, he has taken to a 
less militaristic, revolutionary appearance in the last few years, and Castro even wore a 
suit when he received the Pope). This represents the fondness Fidel still has for the 
military and his identification with it. Because of this eminent backing, the FAR has 
great institutional legitimacy. 
The second component of the FAR's strength is the role it has vis-a-vis the PCc. 
There are two main elements that distinguish this role. The first is that the military 
predates the part. Michael Radu correctly asserts that the "FAR first assumed power as a 
nationalist force. Only later was there a Cuban Communist Party sufficiently loyal to 
Fidel to pretend to control the military."47 This helped to create great organizational 
autonomy for the FAR. The second is the military's representation in the party. The 
FAR maintains significant representation in the PCC's power entity, the Politburo. This 
body consists of24 members, five of which are militarymen.48 Essentially, the FAR is 
still seen as one of the more pro-mass institutions in Cuba, as opposed to the PCC, to 
which less than three percent of the Cuban population belongs.49 
47 Michael Radu, "Cuba's Transition: Institutional Lessons from Eastern Europe," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (Summer 1995): 97. 
48 "Communist Congress Offers Few Concessions," El Nuevo Herald, 13 October 1997. Del 
Aguila, "The Party, the Fourth Congress, and the Process ofCounterreform,"31-32. At the October 97 
party congress, the Politburo was reduced from 26 to 25 members. The Military men are: Eastern Army 
General Ramon Espinosa Martin (added in the Oct '97 party congress); Armed Forces Vice Minister, 
Division General Julio Casas Reguiero; Interior Minister Division, General Abelardo Colome Ibarra; 
Former FAR Chief of Staff and current Minister of Sugar, Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro; and 
Western Army Division General Leopoldo Cintra Frias. 
49 Paul G. Buchanan, "The Mission and Objectives of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces in 
the Transitional Period," in The Military and Transition in Cuba: Reference Guide for Policy and Crisis 
Management, International Research 2000 Inc. (Department of Defense, March 17, 1995), I1I-3-l. 
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The third ingredient of the FAR's institutional power stems from the Ochoa-De 
La Guardia Affair.so In 1989, a full-on power struggle was underway between the 
MINFAR, championed by Raul Castro and the MININT, headed by Division General 
Jose Abrantes. During Cuba's internationalist phase, the MININT achieved great power 
and wealth. They were exposed to many Western ideas and given great license to create 
moneymaking enterprises which included narcotics trafficking. The MININT, under 
General Abrantes, even began to discuss refonn. This battle culminated in the Ochoa-De 
la Guardia Affair. Division General Arnaldo Ochoa was a charismatic hero of the 
revolution and combat veteran. Colonel Tony De La Guardia was an essential member of 
the MININT and a Castro protege. Following what some call a staged trial, both were 
executed for drug trafficking. The MININT was purged and placed under the guidance 
of the MINFAR. In essence, the MININT lost its freedom of movement, and MINFAR, 
in particular Raul Castro, consolidated power over all internal and external security 
matters.51 
The fourth ingredient ofthe FAR's power is their role as the people's army. Part 
of this stems from compulsory military service which consists of two years in the anny or 
three years in the navy. Individuals can join the Youth Labor Anny and serve their 
obligation in the agricultural industry and recruits can now complete their service in the 
various military-run industries. 52 The other part of the tie with the population stems from 
the FAR's position as a "civic soldier."53 
50 For superb account of the Ochoa-De La Guardia affair, see Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's 
Final Hour, 1-129. 
51 Ibid., 61-62. According to Oppenheimer, the 24 March 1989 speech that General Abrantes gave 
to the Union of Cuban Writers and Artists (lINEAC) infuriated Raul Castro. 
52 Alfonso, "Cuba's Armed Forces New Roles," III-I-4. 
53 This term was coined by in Jorge I. Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (Cambridge: 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978),341-378. 
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The civic soldier has been a key political role in Cuba for a long 
time .... Civic soldiers head both military and civilian agencies in Cuba 
and just as military agencies had civilian tasks, civilian agencies had 
military tasks and have used military forms of organization. The Civic 
soldier role includes not only former soldiers heading government 
organizations but also soldiers on active duty engaged in political, 
economic, or other non-military activities.54 
In essence, civic action has been part ofthe military since the revolution began. 
The Cuban populace recognizes that the FAR has been hit equally as hard as they have 
during the special period. This mutual suffering and visible civic action in helping to 
bring Cuba to stability adds greater potency to the military institution. 
The fifth element of the FAR's institutional strength is their professionalism. 
They maintain a well-educated and trained group of officers and troops which leads to a 
strong sense of responsibility and corporateness. There is a nationwide system of 
military training schools for nearly every level of individual in the service. Th~ir 
victories in Angola and Ethiopia provided increased confidence and were a testament to 
their competence and professionalism. In its entirety, there is undisputed evidence of the 
professionalization of the Cuban Armed Forces: 
The professionalization of the armed forces and the stability of its 
doctrine and force structure are evidence of a high degree of military 
institutionalization. The long terms of service characteristic of the best 
officers, the integrated military-school system, and the autonomy of 
military organizations from civilian organizations for military 
recruitment of all since added to their stability and ideological 
coherence and have promoted officer ofloyalty to the armed forces.55 
The sixth element of the FAR's strength, which uniquely emphasizes it as a 
traditional powerhouse, has been its ability to adapt. It has evolved from a militia style 
organization and professionalized; accepted reorganization while maintaining its role as 
civic soldiers; seen its numbers and missions grow dramatically; and watched those 
54 Ibid., 342. 
5S Dominguez, Cuba, 352 
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numbers and missions contract just as astonishingly. The FAR has continued to show 
tremendous flexibility in the face oftoday's changing roles. Phyllis Greene Walker aptly 
points out that" ... the FAR has successfully adapted to the new environment and met the 
new challenges that have arisen. Dramatically cutting its personnel and spending levels, 
it has carried out perhaps the most difficult tasks for any military institution."S6 
It is clear that the FAR has consolidated their position as a powerful institution. 
Their position in political society is second only to the Castro brothers, and, as will be 
shown in the following section, the FAR is a unique institution. 
G. A UNIQUE COMMUNIST AND LATIN MILITARY 
The FAR's history and institutional strength sets them apart from their 
counterparts scattered throughout the former Communist Bloc or in parts of Central and 
South America: it is not controlled by the party nor does it maintain the responsibility for 
repressing Cubans. While the FAR is an influential determinant in maintaining security 
in the regime, it religiously maintains an outward appearance of leaving the dirty work to 
the MININT forces. Although many officers in the FAR are members of the Communist 
Party, the party has not been able to indoctrinate those officers as genuine party members. 
Even the origins of the FAR differ from their Latin brethren: " ... the Cuban military 
differs from its counterparts in the rest of Latin America in many respects. It does not 
have its roots in the traditions of the Spanish conquest and therefore lacks the common 
Latin American tradition of sharp social cleavages between military and civilians or 
between officers and enlisted men.,,57 
56 Phyllis Greene Walker, "Challenges Facing the Cuban Military," from The Georgetown 
Universit~ Caribbean Project's Cuba Briefing Paper Series (Number 12, Oct 1996),4. 
7 Richard L Millett, "Cuba's Anned Forces: From Triumph to Survival," from The Georgetown 
University Caribbean Project's Cuba Briefing Paper Series (Number 4, Sep 1993),2. 
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In contrast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the party in Cuba has never. 
achieved the influence or subjugation ofthe military. One may counter that Fidel and 
Raul are an embodiment of the party and certainly maintain domination ofthe military. 
However, authority exists because of their military background, not their political 
background. Further, the communist party in the Soviet Bloc thoroughly indoctrinated 
the military as a means to maintain control and loyalty. In the FAR, politicization did not 
have the success it had in the communist countries of Europe. Control and loyalty exist 
to the Castro brothers because they demand it through their past actions (witness Ochoa 
and the case of Major Huber Matos) not because of their party connections.58 
Political indoctrination of the FAR began in 1962. Civilian instructors were 
trained at the Osvaldo Sanchez School and then assigned to military units. The military 
commanders essentially rejected these instructors because they were not soldiers. The 
solution was to send officers to the Sanchez School and return them to their respective 
military units to indoctrinate the troops. However, unit commanders left political matters 
to the political instructors.59 This showed to the soldiers that the political mission was not 
nearly as relevant as the military mission. Also in contrast to the Soviets, "a dual 
command system was not implemented; rather the military commanders themselves, not 
the party's functionaries in the FAR, would have the final word.,,60 
Differences between the FAR and Latin militaries are represented in the fact that 
the FAR has not been involved in the level of repression or dirty wars that were dominant 
58 Matos criticized the direction of the revolution openly, in terms of ideology as well as Castro's 
leadership style, and wrote an open letter to Fidel in 1959 resigning his commission. He was sentenced to 
20 years in prison. For more details see Walker "Political-Military Relations Since 1959," 117; and Hugh 
Thomas, The Cuban Revolution (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986),477-478. 
59 Dominguez, Cuba, 367. 
60 Walker "Political-Military Relations Since 1959," 120. 
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in either the Southern Cone or the equally repressive civil wars of Central America. In 
addition, the FAR has never attempted a coup against the existing government. 
Credit for keeping the military out of oppressive action against citizens should go 
to the military commanders and to some extent Fidel. This is not to say that the Castro 
government has not abused its citizenry; it has. However, the tools that have been used 
have been MININT forces, special police, and the Rapid Response Brigades, which are 
essentially goon squads, not the FAR. And while the MINF AR controls the MININT, the 
Cuban military forces have remained on the sideline when unrest has occurred: 
In contrast to the perception of the personnel assigned to the MININT, 
the military's troops are seen as being of the people. This popular myth 
of the Cuban military appears to be much closer to reality than fiction 
when compared to many Latin American countries, where a social 
chasm often separates the military from the general population.61 
Additionally, the MININT lost a generation of officers following the 1989 purge 
and has not been nearly as effective at maintaining a ubiquitous presence in the lives of 
average Cubans. Former Cuban General Rafael del Pino, who defected in 1987, states it 
best, "the Armed forces have not played any repressive role, up to now, against the 
popUlation, and I don't believe they would. That has always corresponded to the Interior 
Ministry. "62 
In sum, the FAR has become a predominant force in Cuban political society. The 
FAR is an established favorite of the elite, is intertwined in the party without yielding its 
professionalism, controls the internal security apparatus, and is a flexible organization 
that has become an essential economic factor in the country. Yet, the FAR has remained 
a military of the people. The FAR is a unique military and potential facilitator in change. 
61 Walker, "Challenges Facing the Cuban Military," 4. 
62 Quoted in Pablo Alfonso, "Proposal Opens the Way for the Cuban Military," EI Nuevo Herald, 
6 February 1997. 
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H. AN AVENUE FOR CHANGE? 
The introduction to the thesis highlighted the fact that liberalization has been a 
precursor to democratic transition. Has there been evidence of liberalization in Cuban 
political society? Are these changes significant enough to force liberalization? A review 
of the changes that have been under way in political society and their support or 
impediment to a liberalization should provide a response which is summarized in Table 
2.1. 
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• High = aspects display institutionalized democratic ideals and a post-Castro relationship will 
likely improve the trend toward political liberalization 
Moderate = aspects mayor may not display institutionalized democratic ideals and/or a post-
Castro relationship could significantly affect the factor. 
Low = aspects do not display institutionalized democratic ideals 
1. Masses 
Mass participation in the political process is a fact in Cuba. There is clear 
evidence that Cubans have tremendous access to the right to vote and exercise that right 
in large numbers and with respect for the political process. There is an established 
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culture of some fonn of the democratic process within the Cuban populace. The 
establishment of the Popular Councils has bolstered the people's ability to choose their 
representatives at the national level. 
Despite these positive influences on liberalization and democracy, the Cuban 
political process eliminates electoral competition. Individuals vying for political 
positions have no access to media and have no ability to campaign nor do their 
supporters. The Cuban Communist Party controls candidates completely, even writing 
the single document that is available to voters. 
2. The Cuban Communist Party (pCC) 
The PCC has shown very little evidence of allowing liberalization in its ranks and 
it is difficult to know what level of reformers exist in the party because those that do 
espouse refonn are typically purged. The legacy the Castro brothers wi1lleave on the 
PCC after their departure will continuously hamper the PCC's ability to accept anything 
less than socialism. The continuous turnover, low representation of the populace, and 
personalization of the party by Castro has limited the PCC' s ability to establish itself as 
an institution capable of creating any real liberalization. Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 
argue correctly that "political institutionalization in general and the party system in 
particular are strongly related to the persistence and stability of democracy.,,63 The lack 
of strong institutionalization of the PCC wi11likely be a detriment to democratic 
transition. 
3. The Cuban Armed Forces 
As noted in the introduction to this thesis, a sovereign state is a prerequisite to 
63 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes Democracies Endure," 33. 
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democracy; there can be no democratic transition without a nation. Because of its 
institutional staying power, professionalism, and identification with the people and the 
nation, the FAR sustains the idea of stateness. 
Another essential element of any liberal transition and strong democracy is the 
establishment of civilian control over the military. The Cuban military has accepted its 
subordination to the Castro brothers and the PCC. Fidel Castro is the Commander-in-
Chief and Raul Castro is the defense minister. The FAR has accepted every mission and 
task the governmental decision-makers have asked of it. 
Further evidence of some level of subordination can be viewed in the dramatic 
decrease in the budget and personnel strength within the FAR as shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Military Expenditures, Military Expenditures (ME) as percent of Gross 
National Product (GNP), and personnel of the Cuban Military 1985-1995, odd 
years.* 
ME in constant 1995 dollars (in ME as percent of Cuban Military Force 
Year millions of dollars) GNP Strenlrth 
1985 1,830 4.5 297,000 
1987 1,690 3.9 297,000 
1989 1,650 3.9 297,000 
1991 1,282 4.3 297,000 
1993 629 (E)t 2.8 175,000 
1995 350 (E) 1.6 70,000 
Source: u.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (US-ACDA) World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) 1985-1995. 
* Cuban tables are believed to omit a share oftotal military expenditures 
t E = estimate 
In just ten years, there has been over a five-fold contraction in military 
expenditures, military expenditures as percent of Cuba's Gross National Product have 
decreased nearly three-fold, and there has been a four-fold reduction in military 
personnel. These dramatic reductions are the sorts ofthings that lead to coups or at least 
extreme discontent, yet this has not happened in Cuba. While there is some evidence of 
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disgruntled military members, the military leadership continues to maintain a 
professional force, and accepts the economic missions the Cuban leadership has asked 
them to do. 
Adaptability is an important potential tool for liberalization in the military. Linz 
and Stepan note: 
The officer corps, taken as a whole, sees itself as a permanent part of 
the state apparatus, with enduring and interests and permanent 
functions that transcend the interests of the government of the day. 
This means that there is always the possibility that the hierarchical 
leaders of the military as institution will come to the decision that the 
costs of direct involvement in non democratic rules are greater than the 
costs of extrication.64 
Indications of the FAR's ability to adapt have been shown throughout this chapter. Their 
changing roles and missions throughout their history certainly point to organizational 
fluidity. 
On the downside, political involvement by the military creates ~ powerful 
obstacle to civilian control and democratic transition. In contrast to the FAR's reduced 
representation in the party, 6S their membership in the Politburo remains at five of 24 
representatives. While the military has been reduced in importance in the official party 
organization, it remains very involved in all phases of the party's decision-making 
apparatus and has become increasingly important in moneymaking enterprises in Cuba.66 
64 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe ( Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), 67. 
65 After the 1991 congress, military representation on the Central Committee dropped to a low of 
12, representing just five percent. This compares to 30 percent in 1975 and 57 percent in 1965. See 
Walker, "Political-Military Relations since 1959," 127. 
66 In addition to the prominent role the military plays in the tourism sector, in October 1997, 
former Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro was named to replace 
Nelson Torres as the head of the Sugar Ministry. Torres had held the position for four years and harvests 
were not very successful. The appointment of the Cuban General was seen by many as an effort to bring 
more discipline into the Sugar Sector. Additionally, it was Rosales' leadership that helped to create self-
sufficiency within the armed forces. See Frances Kerry, "Cuban 97/98 Sugar Harvest to Start Nov. 25," 
Reuters Havana, II November 1997. 
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The military's status as the strongest institution in a post-Castro Cuba could be a 
barrier for further democratic reforms and market adjustments. However, in some 
instances" .. .institutional integrity is eroded by politicization. Eventually, the anned 
forces lose their identity in the state and are perceived as just another government 
agency.,,67 The FAR would have to be willing to give up some of its bureaucratic might 
and make deals with the civilian elites in Cuba sans Castro. 
The FAR has lost considerable funding and had to devote considerable time and 
manpower to economic endeavors. The loss of funding hampers their ability to acquire 
modern equipment and to employ modern military techniques, thus detracting from 
training and professionalism. Dedicating increasing resources to moneymaking and 
agricultural enterprises lessens training opportunities which diminishes the FAR's 
warfighting capabilities and must reduce morale. 
To sum up, in a post-Castro Cuba the FAR, at best, is likely to show moderate 
capacity to allow for democratic transition. At worst, the FAR will be an obstacle to 
democracy. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Overall, Cuban political society has not demonstrated noteworthy liberalization 
since the onset ofthe Cuban transition. It remains in the steadfast control of the Castro 
brothers and their followers. The proponents of inertia are in charge. 
Although the Cuban electoral system and dynamics shows signs of democratic 
culture, it is not a sufficient motivator of change. While the populace has increased its 
67 Enrique Obando, "Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: Lessons Leamed," Rapporteurs' 
Report of presentations at the May 4-6 1995 conference sponsored by The Democracy Projects at American 
University'S School of Intemational Service, Washington, D.C. 
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ability to affect the governmental process, it has not been able to increase any genuine 
liberalization. 
The Cuban Communist party is difficult to analyze because it is limited in its 
overall capability to make changes because of the Castro brothers. Further, it is not in the 
best interests of the PCC to sow the seeds of change. Ifmembers of the party are 
identified as reform-minded, it is likely that they will be purged from the party. Also, it 
is a very difficult proposition to eradicate oneself from a position of power and authority. 
It is not likely that the PCC will be a leader in Cuba's post-Castro transition. 
The Cuban Armed Forces are the strongest institution in Cuba behind the Castros. 
The FAR has tremendous clout as a political, professional, and economic organization. 
The FAR has served many different missions in their history and intermixed well within 
the realm of Cuban politics and society. As such the FAR is the pivotal organization in 
contributing to any kind of change in Cuba. It is the best and most capable group to hold 
Cuba together in the transitional period. While it may not be involved in much more that 
creating a situation whereby it can maintain power and status, there are elements in the 
institution that have lead recent reforms and, as an organization of professional military 
men, recognize the importance of Cuba's tenuous position after Castro. It will take 
extraordinary acts and time to allow the seeds of change to forge democracy in Cuba but 
the Cuban military could be a vital participant in that transition. 
36 
III~ ECONOMIC SOCIETY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Linz and Stepan regard economic society as the arena "which mediates between 
state and market.,,68 In total, it is an arena that is not only made up of a country's 
economy but also how the individuals and institutions in that economy support or 
pressure other societal forces. Linz and Stepan also argue that "modem consolidated 
democracies require a set of socio-politically crafted and accepted norms, institutions, 
and regulations," which make up economic society. Although the authors are specifically 
writing about consolidated democracy, the norms which they discuss are also important 
in creating liberalization that can lead to democratic transition and consolidation. 
In the case of Cuba, there have been considerable changes to the economy since 
the fall of the Soviet Union. How have these changes affected Cuba's economic society 
and in tum how has that economic society affected political and civil society? Does 
Cuba's economic reconstruction portend democracy or is it simply Castro's way of 
placating economic and civil society while maintaining authority over political society? 
This chapter will explore the reorganization the Cuban economy has undergone recently 
and determine ifthese alterations have helped pave the way for a transition to a market 
economy after Castro is gone. 
The framework used here investigates Cuban fiscal reforms, privatization, trade 
liberalization and foreign investment, and credit markets.69 It is essential to note that 
68 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 11. 
69 This framework is a combination of John Williamson, ed. The Political Economy of Policy 
Reform (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994),26-28; and Javier Martinez and 
Alvaro Diaz, Chile the Great Transformation. (Geneva: The United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, 1996), 45-65. Williamson discusses the "Washington Consensus" as a guide for required 
market reforms. Martinez and Diaz use "phases of neoliberal economic policy" to discuss changes Chile 
made to its economy from 1973 -1990 which proved to successfully bring about market change. 
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Cuba remains closed with regard to much of its economic data and a variety of sources 
have been used to obtain that information, including Cuban government sources, which 
may be less than factual. 
B. MARKETANDDEMOCRACY 
There is great debate concerning the market and its relationship to democratic 
reforms.70 Some pundits argue that the market leads to democracy and others argue that 
democracy is required in order to establish the market. Several experts believe that 
authoritarian rule must institute economic reforms prior to the establishment of 
democracy citing Chile, Singapore, and South Korea as examples. Another discussion 
centers on economic reforms coming from a democratically elected government as 
happened in Argentina, Bolivia, Spain and Portugal. Still, others contemplate the 
importance of a dual track approach to entice democracy and the market coincidentally, 
as seen in the former Soviet Union and Communist Bloc. Scholars also point to China 
and Vietnam to show that the market forces do not necessarily forge democracy. 
Regardless of the origins of the market, most authors would agree that free 
economic markets are a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for democracy. Free 
markets help to inculcate ideals of freedom, equity, and opportunity - ideals that are 
inherent in a democracy. Market forces tend to create individual wealth. As individuals 
enjoy increased affluence, they are disposed to consolidate their gains in groups that 
engender increased demands and influence which counter state control. Increased 
freedom of movement and communication created by market forces have a definitive 
70 An excellent discussion of this debate is available in "Economic Reform and Democracy," a 
special edition of the Journal of Democracy (October 1994); and Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the 
Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
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effect on civil society and help to lay the ground work for institutions that lead to and 
maintain democracy. Joan Nelson aptly states: 
The essence of market oriented economic reforms, of course, is the 
sharp reduction of direct state control and intervention in the allocation 
of credit, direct and indirect subsidies, wage determination, and trade 
restrictions .... In this broad sense, market-oriented refonns are 
fundamental to the emergence of more autonomous interest groups, 
political parties, and mediate a much stronger legislative role in public 
policy.71 
Though a market economy does not guarantee democracy, it does "enhance 
democratic values and beliefs, enhance capacities for independent organization of civil 
society, and create a less corrupt, interventionist rent-seeking state.,,72 It is precisely when 
market forces gain prestige and influence that they gain the ability to garner support from 
civil society, because the members of economic society are typically part of civil society. 
After building an influential realm, economic society, backed by civil society, can 
strengthen its new market-oriented gains and induce change from political society. 
c. THE CUBAN ECONOMY 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Cuba's principal patron, the island's economy 
has been in a state of crisis. Cuba's Gross Domestic Product contracted as much as 50 
percent from 1989 to 199373 and an estimated $4-8 billion in subsidies 
from the former Soviet Union disappeared. More than 85 percent of Cuba's trade was 
with countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and it too 
vanished. This trade reduction contributed to the Cuban economic crisis because trade 
71 Joan M Nelson., "Linkages Between Politics and Economics," Journal of Democracy (October 
1994),60. 
72 Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes for Democracy?" 24. 
73 Jorge F. Perez-Lopez., "The Cuban Economy in the Age of Hemispheric Integration," Journal 
of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (Fall 1997),4. 
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had accounted for nearly half of the national product. From 1989-1993, trade decreased 
by 70 percent. 74 
In order to mitigate the impoverishing circumstances prevailing on the island, the 
Castro government embarked on a series of changes that have been viewed as market 
oriented. These reforms included the introduction of farmers' and artisans' markets, 
farming cooperatives, foreign investment, legalization of the dollar and other foreign 
currency, budgetary constraint, self-employment, implementation of a tax system, free 
trade zones, and an effort to reduce Cuba's cumbersome debt. Many of these changes 
were due in part to the pressures that economic society placed on Castro and his 
government. Castro had to make changes to appease these forces. 
While it is probable that Castro has only allowed these changes to occur in order 
to relieve political pressure, the pressure from economic society is undeniable and 
remains evident in Cuba today. Indeed, Castro continues to rail against profiteers and the 
market economy at large. He has allowed reforms in the past only to have them 
"rectified."75 In the last two years, there have been continuous signals from the Castro 
government that the reform process is not to his liking and that wealth is bad: ''the 
reform measures that have been taken to date are timid, and their implementation half-
hearted, in comparison with those adopted by former socialist countries. The objective of 
74 Susan Eckstein, "The limits of Socialism in a Capitalist World Economy: Cuba Since the 
Collapse of the Soviet Bloc" in Miguel Angel Centeno and Mauricio Font, eds. Toward a New Cuba? 
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1997) 136. 
75 From 1971-1986 there was an opening in Cuba's Economic system which included foreign 
investment and farmers' markets. In 1986, this economic opening was abruptly shut down. For further 
discussion see Juan Carlos Espinosa, "Markets Redux: The Politics of Farmers' Markets in Cuba" Cuba in 
Transition, Proceedings of the Annual Meetings of the Associationfor the Study of the Cuban Economy 
(ASCE) 1995. Available [Online] <http://www.lanic.utexas.eduilalcb/cuba/;lsce!> [31 January 1998].51-
73. Also see Carmelo Mesa-Lago, "The Economic Effects on Cuba of the Downfall of Socialism in the 
USSR and Eastern Europe," in Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ed. Cuba After the Cold War (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), 133-138. 
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the measures seems to be more that of preserving the role of the Cuban government to 
that of improving the economic well-being of the Cuban population.,,76 Regardless of 
Castro's opinions concerning wealth and the market, it would be nearly impossible for 
him to completely reverse his direction in favor of closing the market reforms. He needs 
money to keep Cuba out of a terrible crisis, and the market is his best option. In tum 
these reforms and the nature of the market may playa decisive role in establishing a post-
Castro democracy. 
D. CUBAN ECONOMIC REFORMS 
1. Fiscal Policy 
Essentially, the Cubans have been attempting to follow a very tight monetary and 
fiscal policy in an IMF-like fashion while maintaining central control of the economy. 
The plan to reduce Cuban economic inefficiencies was adopted in early March 1994 by 
the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP). Its goal was to reduce subsidies that 
covered losses to enterprises, stimulate personal savings, increase revenue collection 
(mostly through price increases), and develop a comprehensive tax system.77 Since then, 
the Cubans have also attacked liquidity and fiscal problems by reigning in the budget, 
legalizing the dollar, attempting stabilization techniques to maintain the peso's value vis-
a-vis other international currency, and creating a national bank. A number of research 
centers have been created, including some traditionally linked to the Central Committee 
ofthe Communist Party such as the Center for the Study of the Americas (CEA), that 
developed plans for heightened economic liberalization.78 Castro has even been looking 
76 Perez-Lopez., "The Cuban Economy in the Age of Hemispheric Integration," 3. 
77 Ibid., 17. 
78 Mauricio Font. "Friendly Prodding and Other Sources of Change in Cuba. " The Cuba Project of 
Queens College. Available [Online] <http;llwww.soc.qc.eduiprocubalsourch.html> [28 February 1998]. 
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to foreigners for advice, such as Carlos Solchaga, a fonner finance minister for Spain, 
who has provided counsel to the government of Cuba since 1993. Solchaga has been 
pushing for further cuts in loss-making state-enterprises, the creation of small and 
medium sized businesses, and expanded opportunities in the self-employment sector -
sometimes Castro heeds his advice, other times he does not. 79 
a. Budget Austerity 
Cuba continues to follow tight monetary policy because the approach has 
been successful. Unprofitable ministries have been eliminated and others have been 
reduced. For example, in 1997, just 10 enterprises of heavy industry in Cuba were 
offered state aid, a tremendous decrease from 1991, when virtually all industry was 
provided governmental financial support.80 A social security contribution of up to 12 
percent of wages was introduced in early 1995 to pay for the country's financially 
onerous pensions. There has been a substantial increase in prices of some goods and 
services such as tobacco, liquor, electricity, transportation, gas, and mail services to 
increase revenues as well.Bl Some other examples of expenditure reduction: electricity 
rates began to be paid based on usage; charges for museum and sports events were 
instituted; all meals at work centers had to be paid for; student stipends were tenninated 
and students were charged for their unifonns. Students needing financial assistance were 
79 "A Crash Course in Economics," The Economist, 6 April 1996, S5. 
80 Economist Intelligence Unit. Reassessing Cuba: Emerging Opportunities and Operating 
. Challenges (New York: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997), 64. 
Bl Ana Julia Jatar-Hausmann, Through the Cracks of Socialism: the Emerging Private Sector in 




to rely on loans, to be repaid, interestingly, not on needs but on a meritorious basis, the 
higher a student's grades the lower the loan repayment rate. 82 
The results ofthe spending policy have been impressive The deficit was 
reduced from about 5.1 billion pesos in 1993 to an estimated 1.4 billion pesos in 1994.83 
In 1995, the budget deficit had been forecast at one billion pesos, but was actually 
reported as 755 million pesos.B4 Cuban officials reported that the 1997 budget deficit 
would be 468 million pesos.85 In a three year span, the budget deficit dropped from 
nearly 40 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1993 to 3.2 percent in 1997.86 
Despite the positive trends in the economy, the 1998 budget includes 
nearly 2.5 billion pesos for subsidies to government-operated companies, 418 of which 
were reported to be unprofitable, and anticipates a deficit of71O million pesos, a 60 
percent increase from 1997.87 Almost 50 percent of the budget is focused on education, 
health care, and social security. The remaining portion of the budget goes to various 
social services, housing, culture, science and the military, although the military continues 
to finance an increasing portion of their budget from the revenues of commercial . 
operations.88 
b. Taxation 
To improve its fiscal base, Cuba announced a major tax reform and 
created the National Tax Office (NTO) in 1994, a radical development in Castro's Cuba. 
82 Eckstein, "The Limits of Socialism in a Capitalist World Economy," 143. 
83 Archibald R M. Ritter, "The Cuban Economy in the Mid-I 990s: StructurallMonetary Pathology 
and Public Policy" in Toward a New Cuba?, 165. 
84 Perez-Lopez., "The Cuban Economy in the Age of Hemispheric Integration," 23. 
85 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc. "Weekly Updates." Available [Online] 
<hltp:ilwww.cubatrade.orgimarket.html#relations>[31 January 1998], 12 January 1998 to 18 January 1998. 
86 Economist Intelligence Unit. Reassessing Cuba: Emerging Opportunities and Operating 
Challenges (New York: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1997), 7. 
87 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc. "Weekly Updates," 12-18 January 1998. 
88 Ibid. 
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Castro's government instituted a comprehensive income tax law which required that 
government-operated companies gradually shift from being a part of the national budget 
to being quasi-independent entities that functioned on the basis of profit and loss, payroll, 
bank credits, and taxes. Cuba has been serious about these taxes: an estimated 85 percent 
of the self-employed file tax returns voluntarily; auditors have uncovered more than 300 
million pesos in taxes due from government-operated companies; and audits of more than 
100,000 of the self-employed income tax returns generated 12 million pesos in taxes in 
1997. The taxation program has also shown success for Cuba, the NTO reported that 
January 1997 through July 1997 taxes produced revenues of7.37 billion pesos, 270 
million pesos more than planned.89 
Because taxes have been focused on joint ventures and private 
moneymaking enterprises, the policy has a way of curtailing growth and entrepreneurial 
spirit. Essentially, Castro has used tariffs for revenues and as a way of "preventing the 
types of economic activities [he] does not want, namely successful ones.,,90 
c. Monetary Policy 
The decriminalization of holding and using the dollar, as well as other 
foreign currency, was another policy aimed at bolstering the Cuban economy. The 
central government used this currency reform to help reduce the number of pesos in 
circulation which fell from 11 billion pesos at the end of 1993 to 9.9 billion pesos at the 
end of 1994 as a result of a higher savings on one hand and price increases on the other.91 
Pesos in circulation decreased from 9.534 billion in 1996 to between 9.334 billion pesos 
89 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc. "Weekly Updates," 11-17 August 1997. 
90 Luis Locay, "Institutional Requirements for Successful Market Reforms," ASCE 1995, 7. 
91 Ritter, " The Cuban Economy in the Mid-1990s," 162. 
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and 9.384 billion pesos in 1997 according to Cuban sources.92 This policy appears to 
have been effective concerning the exchange rate with the dollar. In 1996, the dollar 
exchanged for an average of 19.2 pesos, in 1997 for an average of22.8 pesos,93 and as of 
February 1998, the peso was trading at 21 to the dollar.94 This shows a dramatic drop 
from the rate of 120 pesos per dollar in the summer of 1994.95 
Unfortunately for Cuba, it seems as if the reduction of pesos has stagnated. 
In essence, the Cuban program has been to centrally ration dollars and other foreign 
currency in an effort to stave off devaluation. The Cuban system has not generated the 
incentives to save which is why they are unable to further reduce the peso circulation. 
d Price Control 
Essentially, there are two levels of price control in Cuba, those which are 
state regulated and those which are set by competitive market pricing. This market 
valuation exists in both the public (farmers' and artisans' markets) and the secondary 
economy or black market: "for the self-employed and for exchanges in the agricultural 
and industrial markets, prices are determined by the forces of supply and demand within 
what often must be highly competitive markets with considerable ease of entry."96 
However, the state maintains fixed prices on nearly all consumer goods which it 
continues to ration, albeit in decreased quantities since 1989. 
92 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., "Weekly Reports," 12-18 January 1998 
93 Ibid. 
94 Prensa Latina, 23 February 1998. 
95 Ritter, "The Cuban Economy in the Mid-1990s," 162. 
96 Ibid., 154. 
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e. Banking Reform 
In May 1997, Cuba established a Central Bank and relegated the National 
Bank of Cuba to commercial activity. The government run press reported that "this was 
necessary to effectively contribute to the economic and financial transformations 
underway in the country."97 The Central Bank is designed to be an autonomous body 
whose purpose is to "protect the purchasing power of the national currency, support the 
balanced development of the economy, and insure the normal functioning of internal and 
external payment systems.,,98 The Central Bank is also designed to control the printing of 
currency, regulate the money supply and credit, establish interest rates, supervise all 
financial institutions, establish internal exchange rates, position the eventual 
convertibility of the peso, represent the government of the Republic of Cuba before all 
international financial institutions, and negotiate foreign debt. 99 The Cuban banking 
institution, however, has no policy of lending money to private citizens. It is designed as 
a mechanism to facilitate international transactions and has no means to stimulate private 
growth. 
In summation, Cuban macroeconomic reforms have been inconsistent and 
have been established primarily to ensure regime survival, rather than a move to a market 
economy. Overall, the reforms have been effective at stimulating limited growth and 
reducing the budget deficit as shown in Table 3.1. 




Table 3.1 Gross Domestic Product (GOP) and Deficit from 1989-1997 (millions of 
pesos). 
Budget Budget 
GDP (in GDPper Change in Deficit(in Deficit as 
millions of Capita (in GDP (in millions of percentage of 
Year GDP 
1989 19,586 1781 1,400 7.1 
1990 19,008 1728 - 3.0 2,000 10.5 
1991 16,875 1534 -11.2 3,700 21.9 
1992 15,010 1365 -11.1 4,200 28.0 
1993 12,777 1162 -14.9 5,100 39.9 
1994 12,868 1169 +0.7 1,400 10.9 
1995 13,185 1198 +2.5 755 5.7 
14,213 1292 +7.8 341 2.4 
14,852 1350 +2.5 468 3.2 
Sources: Dalia Acosta, "Cuba-Economy: Crisis Persists Despite Growth Forecasts," from Inter 
Press Service, 6 April 1997; Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, "The Cuban Economy in the Age of Hemispheric 
Integration," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (Fall 1997): 7; and U.S.-Cuba Trade and 
Economic Council, Inc "Weekly Updates," various dates. 
*E = Estimate 
2. Privatization 
a. Land 
In September 1993, the Cuban government altered the state-run 
agricultural system considerably by instituting farming cooperatives called Basic Units of 
Cooperative Production (UBPC) with the goal to improve efficiency in the agricultural 
industry. Over 2,000 UBPCs were planned for the country and many have already been 
established operating in all aspects of Cuban agriculture. As of 1995, the state sector's 
share of total agricultural land fell from 75 percent to 34 percent and its share of 
cultivated land fell from 88 percent to 25 percent. IOO While the UBPCs do not receive 
ownership ofthe land, which remains with the state, it does become the owner of the 
100 Ritter, "The Cuban Economy in the Mid-1990s," 153. 
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L_ ..... ~ ______________________________________________________ _ 
means of production. UBPCs are more efficient too, using 37 percent less labor than the 
fanns they replaced. 101 
Coupled with the land reform was the September 1994 reintroduction 102 of 
fanners' markets, where cooperatives could sell any surplus they produced beyond their 
state commitments. These state commitments require fanners to sell approximately 80 
percent of their crop at government rates well below market prices. 103 The markets 
proved successful in generating income for the state which charged 200 pesos per stand 
and charged taxes on sales. The first weekend the new farmers' markets were in 
operation approximately 130 markets produced about 700,000 pesos in sales taxes 
alone:04 By late 1995, more than 200 farmers' markets existed. 105 
Initially, the UBPCs and farmers' markets were not a resounding success, 
experiencing difficulties in labor and price stabilization. Government sources cited a 
nearly 20,000 person labor shortage in 1995106 and noted that "the production takeoff of 
agricultural food did not materialize as expected six months after the opening of the 
markets."lo7 Concerning prices, the markets appear to be working after a few years of 
operation and certainly better than the secondary economy had before the opening ofthe 
fanner's markets. This trend is highlighted by the data in Table 3.2. Part of the success 
101 Gillian Gunn Clissold, "Balancing Economic Efficiency, Social Concerns, and Political 
Control," from The Georgetown University Caribbean Project's Cuba Briefing Paper Series (Number 4, 
March 1994). 
102 Farmers' markets were adopted in 1980 and closed under the rectification period in 1986. See 
Font, "Crisis and Refonn in Cuba," 112. 
103 Julie Marie Bunck, "Marxism and the Market: Vietnam and Cuba in Transition," ASCE 1996, 
242. 
104 Eckstein "The Limits of Socialism in a Capitalist World Economy," 143 and Espinosa, 
"Markets Redux: The Politics of Farmers' Markets in Cuba," 62. 
105 Espinosa, "Markets Redux," 62. 
106 Jose Alvarez and William A. Messina Jr., "Cuba's New Agricultural Cooperatives and 
Markets: Antecedents, Organization, Early Perfonnance and Prospects." ASCE 1996, 181. 
107 Ibid., 187. 
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of the markets has to be credited to Cuban entrepreneurial spirit and fervor. 
Table 3.2 Selected Prices at Agricultural Markets in Havana, 1994-1998 (in 
pesos/pound). 
Secondary Market 
Item (June 1994) JanuaI'Y1995 January 1996 Februa 1998 
Rice 50 7 4 4.5 
Black Beans 30 13 9 7 
Pork 75 45 28 23 
Source: Alvarez and Messina Jr., ASCE 1996, 186; U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., 
"Weekly Updates," various dates. 
b. Labor 
Also in September of 1993, the Castro government authorized self-
employment in more that 100 occupations, most of which were in areas such as 
handicrafts, transportation, home repair, and personal services. However, the law had 
several limits: government approved licenses were required; education or health 
professionals were not able to be self-employed; Cubans could not hire other Cubans; and 
university graduates were restricted from self-employment opportunities, although this 
restriction has been lifted as long as the graduate works in a field other than their study. 108 
Much of the reasoning behind the self-employment law was to legitimize 
the activity in Cuba's secondary economy. Before the establishment of farmers' markets 
and self-employment, virtually any foodstuff acquired at the official price could be resold 
at a major profit and "it [was] highly remunerative for people to devote their creative 
economic energies to buying and selling between the [regular and irregular economiesV09 
The collapse of the Cuban economy from 1989 to 1993 and the general shortages of 
nearly all requirements for ordinary life forced consumers to resort to extraordinary 
means to make ends meet. Before 1993, the black market was booming. According to 
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government sources, Cubans spent as much as 60 percent of their income in the informal 
economy in 1993. By 1997, that figure had been reduced to 30 percent and this number 
included "legitimate purchases of produce from local farmers."lIo The entrepreneurial 
spirit of Cubans caused the black-market economy to grow as significantly as it did and 
Castro had to respond. Self-employment, along with farmers' and artisans' markets, and 
the legalization of the dollar, simply replaced burgeoning sectors of the illegitimate 
economy. 
The self-employment law also responded to the poor status of the 
economy which had idled many. Self-employment has provided a market for displaced 
labor as government payrolls have been cut to improve fiscal efficiency. In May 1995, 
the Cuban government began "rationalizing" workers (layoffs) as part of an economic 
restructuring effort to increase economic efficiency. Governmental figures indicated that 
as many as 800,000 of the approximately 4.5 million workforce might be displaced.""1 
Indeed, Cuban officials reported that of the island's 4.5 million workforce, 77 percent 
were employed by the government either directly or through government-operated 
companies; 3 percent worked under the auspice of joint ventures and economic 
associations; and 20 percent worked for themselves, or in cooperatives. 112 
Foreign firms view Cuban labor with high regard. The Cuban labor force 
is highly educated, mobile, disciplined, and inexpensive. Many individuals filling 
1997. 
108 Jorge, F Perez-Lopez, "The Cuban Economy in the Age of Hemispheric Integration," 19. 
109 Ritter, "The Cuban Economy in the Mid-1990s," 154. 
110 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., "Weekly Updates," 27 October -2 November 
111 Joseph M. Perry, Louis A. woods and Jeffrey W. Steagall, " Alternative Policies to Deal with 
Labor Sumluses During the Cuban Transition," ASCE 1996, 91. 
1 2 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., "Weekly Updates," 5-11 January 1998. 
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positions in the tourist industry are doctors, teachers, and engineers who prefer to work 
for dollar tips rather than their meager peso salaries which range from 100-500 pesos a 
month. For example, of the more than 300 Cubans employed by a hotel chain in the 
resort town ofVaradero, a quarter have post-graduate degrees. In a neighboring hotel, 
over three-quarters of the employees have university education. This points to some 
inherent problems in an employment system where waiters can earn more money than 
doctors, but there is a definite advantage to Cuban labor because of the workers' 
education, discipline, and mobility. 
Recently, the Castro government has reversed course concerning self-
employment and the rolls had dropped from over 200,000 in 1995 to less than 170,000 by 
the close of 1997. Essentially, Havana does not like the competition self-employment 
provides and has been reasserting state authority. An example of restricted competition 
included regulations on paladares (home restaurants). The paladares have been able to 
provide tourists with better, less-expensive food and better service than state-owned 
restaurants, and accordingly have cut into the state's clientele. The government 
responded by briefly outlawingpaladares. 
These restrictions and the reallocation of private enterprise to state control 
serve to emphasize the capricious nature of the Cuban reforms. Fines are routinely levied 
against the self-employed and they are also the primary targets of Castro's taxation 
policy. "The government's message is clear: if you need to engage in self-employment to 
survive, do so, but do not go beyond survival or you'll be punished."ll3 
JJ3 Locay, ASCE 1995, 7. 
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c. Industry 
Most Cuban industries remain in state control and structurally planned. 
The exception is the Sociedad Anonima (SA). SAs are essentially semi-private 
companies that act independently of the central state apparatus. They are designed to 
maximize profits and engage in joint ventures inside and outside of Cuba. Cuba has 
arranged for most ofthese corporations to be owned privately by individual Cubans.1I4 
There are literally hundreds of SAs, many as part of joint ventures, throughout the 
tourism, service, and light industry sectors of the Cuban economy. SAs are increasingly 
efficient and profitable, providing attractive options for foreign investors. 
E. TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The ambitious Foreign Investment Law of 1995 opened broad areas of the Cuban 
economy to the international market. Areas excluded are in health, education, and the 
armed services, with the exception of the military's commercial system. The policy set 
within the framework of the law is designed to encourage economic integration and 
foreign investment. The law provides foreign investors with full protection from 
expropriation and stipulates indemnification if expropriation does take place. It allows 
for sales and transfers of companies to the State or to a third party. It guarantees free 
transference of profits and the freedom for the joint venture company to import and 
export. The law also authorizes property rights for permanent non-residents of Cuba. I 15 
The law does provide some limits on joint ventures, most notably in the 
114 Andrew Zimbalist, "Refonning Cuba's Economic System from within," in Jorge F. Perez-
Lopez, ed. Cuba at a Crossroads: Politics and Economics after the Fourth Party Congress, 233. 
m Republic of Cuba Cuban Law on Foreign Investment. Presented at the 5th Ordinary Period of 
Sessions, National Assembly of the People's Power, 4 September 1995, Articles 3, 6, 10, 16, and 29. 
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employment process. 116 International firms must go through a Cuban government entity 
in order to hire Cubans. Joint ventures are obligated to pay taxes at a rate designated by 
the Cuban government. Foreign companies must open an account in the Cuban banking 
system where they must receive and make payments related to their operations, and are 
required to pay Cuban nationals in pesos which must be obtained beforehand from 
convertible foreign currency. 117 
The Foreign Investment Law has been key in providing Cuba with increased 
trading partners, hard currency, employment opportunities, and investment. As of March 
1998, over 330 joint ventures with capital from over 40 countries in 34 economic sectors 
were working on the island. 118 These firms have announced investment of more than $5 
billion and have already committed $1.25 billion. Jl9 
In addition to foreign investment, the Castro government has been moving ahead 
with plans to open free trade and manufacturing zones with exemptions from taxes and 
custom duties. Three of five planned zones are now open: one next to the Havana 
International Airport, another on the eastern outskirts of the capital, and a third at the 
former naval port of Marie I (30 miles west of Havana). The fourth zone will be at 
Cienfuegos, another former naval facility, in south central Cuba, and the fifth is to open 
116 According to the U.S. Economic Trade Council Inc., joint ventures must contract with a Cuban 
employment agency to hire Cuban nationals. The companies pay directly to the agency, in dollars, the 
monthly salary of each employee. The agency then pays the workers in Pesos. For example, an average 
monthly wage for a skilled worker is 300 Pesos to 500 Pesos. The company pays the agency 300 to 500 
dollars per month. Workers almost always receive a dollar-based cash or product bonus in addition to their 
monthly salary (worth upward of 100 dollars per month). 
117 Ibid., Articles 9, 26, and 33. 
118 Prensa Latina, 7 March 1998. 
119 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., "Weekly Updates, 2 - 8 June 1997. 
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near Santiago De Cuba, Cuba's second largest city, in the southeast of the island. At the 
close of 1997, 190 foreign firms were operating in the duty-free zones. 120 
Cuba has aggressively tried to reintegrate into the world economy through high 
level visits and essentially allowing market-trading forces to take shape. By the end of 
1997, Cuba had established commercial and economic relations with 138 countries. 121 
The results of the aggressive effort to expand trade and increase foreign 
investment are noteworthy. As shown in Table 3.3, Cuban trade has increased 
significantly since the 1993 low, though it has not reached near 1989 levels. Also shown 
in Table 3.3 is the dramatic increase of joint ventures in Cuba. 
Table 3.3 Cuban Trade (in billions of pesos) and Joint Ventures (total) from 1989 to 
1997. 
Year Total Exports Imports Joint V entures 
1989 13.5 5.4 8.1 2 
1990 12.8 5.4 7.4 2 0 
1991 7.2 3.0 4.2 5 0 
1992 4.1 1.8 2.3 8 0 
1993 3.1 1.1 2.0 11 2 
1994 3.3 1.3 2.0 1 80 
1995 4.3 1.5 2.8 21 2 
1996 5.3 1.9 3.4 2 60 
1997 T 33 0* 
Sources: U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.; Perez-Lopez, "Cuban economy in the Age 
of Hemispheric Integration." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (Fall 1997): 8. 
= data not available 
• = 330 as of March 1998 
F. CREDIT 
Because Cuba is not a member of either the IMF or the World Bank, guarantees 
normally available to foreign investors are not available in Cuba. Lack of financial 
guarantees imposes the greatest difficulty on the Cuban economy. Cuban debt 
120 Prensa Latina, 5 February 1998. 
121 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc., "Weekly Updates, 15 - 22 February 1998. 
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instruments, all of which are in default, are grouped in a class of debt instruments known 
as exotic. Short-term loans are about the only loans available to Cuba and their interest 
ranges between 14-20 percent. 122 
Changes in the credit market for Cuba appear to be on the horizon. In 1998 Cuba 
made inroads on restructuring part of its foreign debt, estimated at about $10 billion. 
Cuba signed accords with Italy, Argentina, and Japan, Cuba's largest creditor. These 
deals totaled over $1 billion. Cuba has been quietly approaching other countries with 
restructuring solutions and they seem to have been reaching favorable agreements. 123 
This is a very positive step in Cuba's economic recovery and acceptance in the world 
market. 
G. AN AVENUE FOR CHANGE?· 
Havana officials, including Fidel and Raul Castro, have repeatedly stated that the 
purpose of the reforms is to create productivity and efficiency in the Cuban model, not to 
give rise to a market economy.124 Nevertheless, there are market-oriented forces 
operating in Cuba and the market has an uncanny ability to establish roots in the cracks of 
socialist systems. Is the market an inexorable force in a post-Castro Cuba or are there too 
many obstacles in place in the Cuban socialist economic system? A review of the 
economic reforms and their support or impediment to a free market should provide a 
response, which is summarized in Table 3.4. 
122 Gabriel Fernandez, "Cuba's Hard Currency Debt," ASCE 1996, 44. 
123 Andrew Cawthorne, "Cuba CENBANK Chief Reveals Debt Progress," Reuters, 19 October 
1998. 
124 Locay, ASCE 1995, 8. 
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• High = Market-oriented factors are in place and a post-Castro relationship will likely improve 
trend toward a free market. 
Moderate = Market-oriented factors mayor may not be in place but statist policies are 
impediments to a free market and may not be overcome in a post-Castro transition. 
Low = Market-oriented factors are not in place and post-Castro transition will have little effect. 
1. Fiscal Reforms 
The overall macroeconomic stabilization program underway in Cuba is a key 
element of economic liberalization. Moises Nairn argues that the first stage of 
liberalization includes changing macroeconomic rules, reducing the size and scope of the 
state, and dismantling institutions of protectionism and statism. Instruments such as 
drastic budget cuts, tax reform, price liberalization, deregulation, and monetary 
stabilization fall in-line with typical economic openings.125 Cuba has accomplished much 
125 Moses Nairn, "Latin America: the Second State of Reforrn," Journal of Democracy (October 
1994),37. 
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of these changes in whole or in part. 
Despite the positive trends in the macro economy, Castro's policies have been 
half-hearted and inconsistent. The budget remains centered on social programs, leaves 
very little for investment, and continues to support inefficient government organizations. 
2. Privatization 
Whether through self-employment, the creation ofUBPCs, the secondary 
economy, or semi-autonomous corporations, the private sector is an emerging force on 
the island generating greatly needed hard currency and helping to attract foreign 
investment. Privatization has shown success with market-oriented pricing in farmers' 
and artisans' markets and satisfies a need for displaced labor in Cuba. In a post-Castro 
Cuba, this sector will be a source of small firms, entrepreneurial spirit, and a critical 
element to the formation of the middle class. "The nature of Cuba's planned economy 
itself has inadvertently promoted widespread entrepreneurial values, attitudes, behavior, 
and savoir-faire, as citizens out of necessity have had to buy and sell, barter, hustle, and 
network to improvise solutions to their personal economic problems."126 
To counter the growing private sector, the government has reasserted itself, 
limiting self-employment and attempting to maintain authority and control. While the 
state has ostensibly privatized most of the agricultural sector, it maintains property rights 
and requires 80 percent of agricultural production. The degree of control and autonomy 
which UBPC members have in the operation of their farms is limited compared to other 
markets, but it does represent an improvement from the state-run farms. There are no 
126 Archibald R. M. Ritter, "Entrepreneurship, Microenterprise, and Public Policy in Cuba: 
Promotion, Containment, or Asphyxiation?" Journal Of Inter american Studies and World Affairs (Summer 
1998),63. 
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medium or large private enterprises in Cuba. Cubans still do not have the right to own 
private property, one ofthe essential elements of a market economy. 
3. Trade Liberalization and Foreign Investment 
The greatest strides toward a market-oriented economy have occurred Cuba's 
trade and foreign investment policies. The policies of reintegration, expanded trade, joint 
ventures, and free trade zones are positive features that portend further market reforms. 
Although foreign investors are still denied autonomy in employment practices and have 
not achieved access to all of Cuba's critical markets, they are an ever-increasing power in 
Cuba. Increased involvement from Western firms and incorporation of market-oriented 
business practices augur well for an open economy now and even more so post-Castro. 
4. Credit Market 
Cuba's huge debt and lack of access to investment instruments are tremendous 
hindrances to market reform and recovery. Not only does Cuba have limited entrance to 
world sources of capital such as the IMF and the World Bank; there are no indigenous 
establishments that provide credit to any level of business. While the government after 
Fidel may be incorporated into world financial bodies, there is no guarantee that a new 
organization will accept IMF or World Bank assistance, which are likely viewed as 
instruments of the United States. Although Cuba has attempted to restructure its debt 
through negotiation and innovative means, the huge financial liability will be a definite 
encumbrance to a market economy. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Market economies are a necessary, though not sufficient, means toward 
democratic transition. The market instills ideas of freedom and fosters an environment 
for increased public access and involvement in the political process. The economic 
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changes that Cuba has undergone since the loss of their Soviet benefactor should playa 
positive role in the creation of a civil society with democratic ideals in a post-Castro 
Cuba. Castro's departure will create opportunity for reform-minded technocrats to ally 
with other military and political elites and institute further market-oriented refonns. 
The Castro government has embarked on a process that is, by their own 
admission, irreversible. Notwithstanding the fact that "the current policy approach is 
punitive, restrictive, and discriminatory and seems to be designed mainly to hold back the 
evolution of small and middle-sized enterprise ... ,"127 Havana is required to maintain a 
course of economic liberalization in order to stave off the collapse of its economy, 
political unrest, and to ensure regime survival. Cuba's austere fiscal policy has opened a 
path for refonners and has helped to create a framework for market practices such as tax, 
currency refonn, and banking reform, as well as the reduction of state payrolls. 
Privatization in land, labor, and industry, though limited, is gaining influence and will 
playa vital role in transformation to a market economy. Economic involvement from 
forces outside of Cuba has had the greatest impact toward market reforms and will 
continue to do so after Castro. The greatest obstacle to an open economy in a Cuba 
without Fidel is a debilitating credit situation. 
Clearly, it is difficult to accurately predict the future of Cuba without Castro, but 
the forces ofthe market are already playing a prominent role in Cuba's outlook. Several 
institutions are already in place which will allow market forces to take over after Castro 
and have clearly had a liberalizing effect on political and civil society. This portends the 
best prospects for a democratic transition in Cuba. 
127 Ibid., 64. 
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IV. CIVIL SOCIETY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Civil society is that arena "where self-organizing groups, movements, and 
individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create 
associations and solidarities, and advance their interests."128 Civil society consists of a 
wide array of formal and informal organizations such as interest groups, cultural and 
religious organizations, and civic groups. Civil society mobilization had a tremendous 
impact on transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Recently, civil society actors 
in Cuba have been able to wrest some elements of control from the Castro government. 
What have these changes been? Do the changes in Cuban civil society portend 
democracy or are they simply a control mechanism of Castro? How was Cuban civil 
society impacted by Pope John Paul II's visit in January 1998? The purpose of this 
chapter is to explore the changes Cuban civil society has undergone since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union - the onset of Cuba's transition - and determine if these alterations have 
helped pave the way for a transition to democracy after Castro is gone. 
B. CIVIL SOCIETY, TRANSITION, AND DEMOCRACY 
There is little doubt surrounding the importance of civil society and its 
relationship to democracy. The literature on this subject is vast and virtually all points to 
the role that civil society has to play in transitions from authoritarian rule. 129 The 
128 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 7. 
129 Linz and Stepan in Problems of Democratic Transition; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, Politics in 
Developing Countries; and Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (New York: 
The Penguin Press, 1994) are good starting points. An excellent work on Cuba is Gillian Gunn Clissold, 
"Cuba's NGOs: Government Puppets or Seeds of Civil Society." The Georgetown University Caribbean 
Project's Cuba Briefing Paper Series (Number 14, May 1997). Available [Online] 
<hup:/Iwww.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/c1as/Caribe/cbps.htm> [15 April 1998]. 
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significant role public actors played in mobilizing the opposition and creating the impetus 
for transitions in South America and Eastern Europe is undeniable. 
Ernest Gellner describes civil society as "a set of diverse non-governmental 
institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing 
the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major 
interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of 
society."130 Key to this definition is autonomy from the state, some fonn of coalescence, 
and the role non-governmental groups can play in' counterbalancing the weight of the 
ruling polity. 
What role does civil society play in leading democracy? It often acts as an agent 
that can help to bring about liberalization. Alfred Stepan accurately assesses the 
importance of liberalization as opposed to democratization arguing that the fonner refers 
specifically to civil society. He discusses liberalization as "governmental policy and 
social changes that create greater room for various groups ... ."131 Civil society creates 
opportunities and space for non-governmental actors and forces state liberalization 
policies. At some point, "fissures in the authoritarian power bloc appear which suggest to 
the civil society that at least some fonns of autonomous organization will not be 
repressed. [This] marks the onset of liberalization.,,132 
An energized civil society can seize upon political openings and create 
tremendous opportunity to bring about change. Civil society is linked with economic 
society in an authoritarian state because both ofthese forces are trying to create space for 
130 Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, 6 
131 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), 6. 
132 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, 56. 
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increased freedoms. Civil society is linked with political society because it is the state 
that civil society actors must challenge in order to achieve increased political space and 
organizational goals. 
C. THE STATE, LIBERALIZATION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CUBA 
In Cuba, civil society is generally in its infancy and has not been able to create the 
political space required to bring about great liberalization policies from the Castro 
government. Civil society in Cuba is more responsible for making subtle changes. 
Marifeli Perez-Stable is accurate in assuming civil society in Cuba does not 
necessarily behave in an organized fashion, nor do they make use of 
formal means to their ends .... Instead, the [emergent] society is 
constituted by a wide spectrum of organized and unorganized interests 
that have changed the social power of the state, redistributed it among 
diverse groups of varying degrees of autonomy, and opposed the 
government's efforts to maintain state control. 133 
This understated activity has been slowly gaining strength in Cuba since the fall 
of the Soviet Union and has forced some liberalization in the Castro government. This is 
not to say, however, the Cuban state does not exert tremendous authority in the every day 
life of Cuban citizens. 
1. The State 
The Cuban state remains pervasive in Cuba and has virtually all the means of 
control at its disposal. The most important aspect of the state's control has been its 
legitimacy which is anchored in nationalism and the Revolution. Castro himself is the 
critical component of state control and legitimacy because he personifies both 
133 Marifeli Perez-Stable, "The Invisible Crisis: The Exhaustion of Politics in 1990s Cuba," in 
Toward a New Cuba?, 40. 
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Nationalism, and the Revolution. 134 
There is no doubt that the state uses a variety of methods to control and suppress 
the Cuban people. State control mechanisms include arrests, the Committees for the 
Defense ofthe Revolution (CDRs), the Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC), and 
Rapid Reaction Brigades. The state controls the media, education, the military, and the 
Interior Ministry. A study ofthe CDRs will illustrate how pervasive the state is in 
everyday life. 
2. Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs) 
The CDRs were created in the 1960s and have made a unique contribution to the 
Cuban revolution. They act as a politicized, government-controlled neighborhood spy 
organization and essentially have "brought about the permanent presence of the social 
control system carried out by the state within family units.'tJ3S Today they count about 80 
percent of the adult population as members. 136 
The CDRs are organized at every level of the Cuban polity from a national 
organization down to city block groups. The CDRs work directly with state 
organizations such as the police, the Interior Ministry, and the FAR. CDR officials have 
the duty to know the activities of each person in their respective blocks and to maintain 
files on everyone. Additionally, within each block, there is one other agent who deals 
indirectly with the CDRs: this person reports directly to an officer of the state security 
134 Perez-Stable offers an excellent discussion of what she terms the trilogy that sustains the 
regime. Her trilogy includes Fidel, love of the homeland, and the revolution. See Perez-Stable, "The 
Invisible Crisis," 42. The level of legitimacy the Castro government has achieved is a contentious issue. 
For some various discussions on this subject, see Gonzales, Cuba Clearing Perilous Waters; Centeno and 
Font, Toward a New Cuba; Perez-Lopez, Cuba at a Crossroads; and Paul Buchanan, "The FAR and Cuban 
Society," and Jaime Suchlicki, "Current Assessment of Cuba," in The Military and Transition in Cuba. 
I3S Perez-Stable, "The Invisible Crisis," 43. 
136 Elizabeth Breland, Prerequisites For Democracy in Cuba: Promoting Liberalization via Civil 
Society (M. A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1993),21. 
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apparatus. Regular national, provincial, municipal, and zone meetings are called and 
CDR presidents are required to attend and to pass infonnation from these meetings to the 
citizens in their blocks. There are clear links between CDRs and the state such as the 
Rapid Response Brigades, goon squads created in 1991, which may show up on 
someone's doorstep with hammers, clubs, and bricks to dissuade potential dissidents. 137 
Citizen participation is essentially a requirement in these CDRs because they have 
tremendous access to the means of virtually all the necessities oflife in Cuba. 
D. LIBERALIZATION 
1. Economic Liberalization 
Despite all the mechanisms of control available to Castro, civil society, economic 
realities, and international pressure have forced some changes. In today's context, the 
economic and political foundations of Marxist-Leninist philosophy are on tenuous 
footing; witness the liberal economic changes in Russia, China, Vietnam, and the nations 
of Central and Eastern Europe. In regard to the demise of socialism, Nelson Amaro 
prudently notes, "at some point in time, the parties in power realize that the system does 
not function as it was anticipated and begin to remedy this situation through policies to 
manage the regime effectively."138 The Castro government has been forced to undertake 
significant changes to maintain its power, most notably in the economic realm, but also in 
the political realm. 
The market-oriented changes that the Castro government has instituted are well 
documented in Chapter III of this thesis and include various changes in the land, labor, 
137 Nelson Amaro, "Decentralization, Local Government, and Citizen Participation in Cuba." 
ASCE 1996, 273-276. 
138 Ibid., 262. 
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and capital restrictions in Cuba. The decentralization of the economy constituted a 
significant departure from Castro's rhetoric against capitalism and market oriented 
economics. More importantly, the liberalization was instituted to placate the increasingly 
disgruntled masses and the demands they began to make on their government after the 
economy failed. Gellner points out that "economic decentralization is essential. .. and 
constitutes a precondition of anything resembling a civil society."J39 Economic 
liberalization created political space for civil society. 
Because of the Cuban economic reconstruction, the private sector has become a 
force on the island, generating greatly needed hard currency and helping to attract foreign 
investment. Privatization has shown success with market-oriented pricing in farmers' 
and artisans' markets and satisfies a need for displaced labor in Cuba. In a post-Castro 
Cuba, this arising sector will be a source of small firms, entrepreneurial spirit, and a 
critical element to the formation of a robust civil society. 
2. Political Liberalization 
In 1991, the CDRs began to roll back their revolutionary zeal in deference to the 
difficulties in the Cuban economic situation. CDRs reduced their meetings to one every 
three months from once a month and other party organizations followed their lead. 140 
Cuban citizens were granted political space in the form of electoral reform in the 
1992 Constitution. In 1992, the populace began to directly elect representatives to the 
National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP). Before that, the Municipal Assembly 
member, following their election, selected provincial and national representatives. 141 
139 Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, 88. 
140 Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, 310. 
141 Amaro, "Decentralization, Local Government and Citizen Participation," 269. 
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Another aspect of state decentralization can be observed in the creation of Popular 
Councils (CPs) documented in Chapter II. CPs have created greater efficiency in local 
municipalities and helped to create a critical tie from civil society to both economic and 
political society actors. This political liberalization has provided the masses with greater 
access to both economic and political arenas. 
There has been an explosive growth of Cuban NGOs since 1989 and these 
represent challenges to the state on various levels. Approximately 2,200 NGOs are now 
registered with the government and many others exist underground. While the state still 
requires NGOs to register with it under specific laws written in 1985, Castro's acceptance 
of NGOs on the island is a significant change which empowers the Cuban populace.142 
Political space has been created in Cuba civil society through the relaxation of 
CORs, the expanded involvement of the citizenry in elections and local participation, and 
the emergence of NGOs. CPs and NGOs have demonstrated some independent thought 
and decentralization. Activities these groups organize help to implement economic and 
other reforms and are crucial ties to political and economic society. They could be key in 
mobilizing a civil society after Castro. 
E. CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOS 
Civil society and NGO were once seditious terms in Cuba. Officials argued that 
the state inherently reflected the will of the people and independent citizens groups were 
unnecessary. This has begun to change. Fidel Castro used the term, "civil society," at 
the 1994 Thero-American Summit and Gaceta, the official journal of the state-controlled 
writers' union, recently defended the expression's legitimacy. 143 
142 Gillian Gunn Clissold, "Cuba's NGOs: Government Puppets or Seeds of Civil Society," I. 
143 Ibid. 
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A key element of civil society is the unorganized masses and their forms of 
communication. In Cuba, these societal bonds take place in the form of entre socios or 
between partners. A role performed by ordinary citizens who use whatever means at 
their disposal to survive and help their communities survive as well. 
These ties existed in Cuba prior to the [economic] crisis, but they 
expanded along with a growing acceptance among Cubans who found 
in them a solution to their more immediate problems. This process, far 
beyond its economic importance, has transcendental consequences for 
the development of a civil society. 144 
These informal ties are buttressed further by Cuba's homogenous population. In a 
country of 11 million people, there does not exist the type of ethnic diversity seen in 
Eastern Europe which created some difficulties in the emergence of civil society. The 
Cuban populace speaks Spanish, is well educated, and has developed strong communal 
ties in order to survive the "special period." The issue of race does playa factor in Cuba 
and may be more important after Castro if a predominantly white exile community 
confronts Cuba's black population. However, the race issue is not a predominant feature 
of Cuban society and Castro's revolution has aided this fact. 145 Familial links off the 
island through communication and cash remittances, have also bolstered entre socios. 
Though these elements are not organized, per se, they do represent a potential vehicle for 
popular mobilization in the post-Castro era. 
Organized social groups also exist in Cuba in the form ofNGOs, and Castro's 
government tacitly accepts them because of their ability to receive foreign donations and 
144 Perez-Stable, "The Invisible Crisis," 41. 
145 For a discussion on race relations in Cuba see Alejandro de la Fuente and Laurence Glasco, 
"Are Blacks Getting out of Control?," 53-72. In this work, the surveyed the Cuban populace on aspects of 
pre and post revolutionary Cuba. Their data show that racism has become a less important issue in Cuba. 
For example, 79 percent of black respondents to their survey felt that discrimination was over but some 
prejudices remained. Additionally, 65 percent of blacks felt that they were well represented in the Cuban 
leadership and only 7 percent felt that there should be an all-black organization. 
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contribute to the economy. Nevertheless, the state remains circumspect about these 
organizations and maintains control over their establishment. NGOs must register with 
and be accepted by the state to be legal. Organizations must provide at least thirty names 
with detailed personal information about the top leadership, prove they are self-financing, 
submit written goals, and obtain a negative certificate from the Ministry of Justice stating 
that there is no other registered NGO with a similar purpose. The NGO must also obtain 
the sponsorship of a state institution and allow the institution to attend board meetings 
and inspect its accounts to confirm it is carrying out Its stated purpose. 146 
Gillian Gunn Clissold's research in 1994 provides the greatest insight and 
information about Cuban NGOs. She asserts that there are two types ofNGOs: top-down 
government-sponsored groups and bottom-up grass roots establishments. State-
sponsored NGOs include the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), the National 
Association of Small Cultivators (ANAP), and the Union Of Writers of Cuba (UNEAC). 
The government of Cuba has only recently labeled these groups as NGOs and their 
identification as non-governmental is circumspect because they typically have been 
instruments of government control. Many of the leaders of these top-down NGOs are 
key members ofthe state. For example, FMC leader Vilma Espin is the wife of Raul 
Castro, and UNEAC head Abel Prieto is a member ofthe Cuban Politburo. 147 Other state-
sponsored groups include think tanks like the Center for the Study of America (CEA) and 
the Center for European Studies (CEE). Both organizations receive funding from the 
state but also receive much of their budgets from external sources. 148 
146 Ounn Clissold, "Cuba's NO Os," 2. 




Religious organizations' represent the most prominent group of bottom-up NGOs, 
and have capitalized on the space created by Castro when religious practice was officially 
recognized in 1991. The Catholic Church, through its charity Caritas, receives 
humanitarian donations, primarily food and medicine, from abroad independent of the 
state. The Yoruba Cultural Association of Cuba was established in 1991 to promote 
Afro-Cuban religious traditions commonly referred to as Santeria. Other religious 
organizations include Protestant churches and Masons. 149 
Non-religious grassroots organizations have developed as well. The Felix Varela 
Center, established by a former Central Committee staffer in 1990, sponsors recreation 
for young cancer patients and has organized a community-based paint factory. The Pablo 
Milanes Foundation, established in 1990 by the popular Cuban singer and financed with 
proceeds from his musical endeavors, provides support for young Cuban artists and aids 
independent cultural institutions. ISO 
Though most are not recognized as NGOs, human rights groups also exist in 
Cuba. The first of these groups, and probably most important, is the Cuban Committee 
for Human Rights, founded in 1976. It advocates respect for human rights based on the 
UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a market economy, free press, and free 
expression. lSI Other human rights groups in Cuba include the Association for Free Art, 
the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation, and the Human 
Rights Party in Cuba, all founded in the late 1980s. Dozens more have sprung up in the 
149 Ibid. 
ISO Ibid. 
lSI Juan M. del Aguila, "Politics of Dissidence," in Conflict and Change in Cuba, eds. Enrique A. 
Baloyra and James A. Morris (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), 170. 
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1990s. Leaders of these groups are subject to various forms of repression from the state 
and many have been imprisoned. 
Gunn Clissold points out that the division of Cuban NGOs into two categories "is 
drawn for the sake of analytical clarity."152 Most ofthe organizations cross the lines of 
grassroots or state sponsored. The state frequently attempts to convert bottom-up NGOs 
into government instruments, while citizens occasionally try to re-shape top-down NGOs 
into grassroots organizations. 153 
These groups serve two important pUIposes in helping to establish civil society in 
Cuba. First, they work to gain space from the state in various ways. Human rights 
groups in particular confront the state directly. In 1988, Castro denied that human rights 
groups existed in Cuba and railed against them as "organizations ofliars and slanderers, 
that's what we have here. And they will never be legalized. That's wishful thinking.,,154 
While the human rights groups do not have state recognition, they do exist in Cuba, 
despite Castro's harsh rhetoric. Second, these groups help to rally the populace: ''the 
presence of these groups establishes a cleavage at the grass roots; human rights activists 
comprise the leading edge of an increasingly visible and assertive adversary culture that 
seeks to communicate directly to both Cuban society and international public opinion."155 
Whether approved by the state or not, the explosive growth ofNGOs has contributed to 
the growth of Cuba's infant civil society. 
152 Gunn Clissold, "Cuba's NGDs", 3. 
153 Ibid., 7. 
154 Quoted in del Aguila, "Politics of Dissidence," 176. 
155 Ibid., 179. 
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F. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 
It is important to highlight the Catholic Church in Cuba as an extremely important 
mass organization, because it is the single most substantial societal actor in Cuba. It has 
independence from the state and has also begun to challenge Castro's policies. 
Approximately 40 percent of the population has been baptized and can be identified with 
Catholicism, although many of the popUlation also identify with Santeria, the most 
prominent religion on the island. l56 Caritas, the worldwide Catholic relief organization, 
acts independently of the State. Archbishop Jaime Ortega was made Cardinal in 1994, 
elevating the importance of Cuba on Pope John Paul II's scope and vice-versa. Finally, 
the visit of the Pope in January 1998 bolstered the importance of the Church in Cuba and 
appears to have forced greater Church role in demanding change from Castro. It is 
interesting to note that since the early days of the Cuban Revolution, the Church and the 
state have had conflict. 
Although many priests went into exile following the revolution, more than 200 
remained. As a result, the Catholic Church initially was more inclined to challenge the 
government and was less vulnerable to reprisals for doing so. Now, the church has a 
well-organized hierarchical structure on the island which has made government pressure 
on individual parishes or priests less feasible. This structure is well supported by the 
international features of the Church. ls7 
156 Kenneth L. Woodward, "Our Man in Havana," Newsweek, 19 January 1998,34, and 
Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour, 340. Oppenheimer notes that as many as 4000 Babalaos (Santeria 
priests), existed in Cuba in 1991. In comparison, there were only 250 roman Catholic priests. 
157 Shawn T. Malone, "Conflict, Coexistence, and Cooperation: Church-State Relations in Cuba." 
The Georgetown University Caribbean Project's Cuba Briefing Paper Series (Number 10, August 1996). 
A vailable [Online] <http://www.georgetown.eduist.s/programsiclas/Caribc/cbps.htm> [15 April 1998], 4-5. 
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Caritas delicately manages the discord with the government in order to maintain 
its strength within Cuba and has emerged as an important model for other NGOs. The 
state-run organization that grants permission to NGOs to exist in Cuba 
insists that state institutions, mainly hospitals, schools and retirement 
homes, be the final distributors of donated products. Caritas ensures 
that only intended recipients consume the donated products by 
designating a "sympathetic individual" at each institution to report end-
use. The charity seems satisfied that donations are generally used for 
their designated purpose. In fact, the Caritas monitoring network is 
acquiring such a solid reputation that other NOOs have asked it to 
evaluate end-use of their donations too. 158 
In the past, the Church has been very reluctant to challenge the state, seeking 
"coexistence."ls9 However, since 1991 the Church has taken on a greater role. It has 
been prominent in calling for reconciliation with exile groups, has publicly decried the 
state's control of the media, and has challenged governmental policies regarding human 
rights. The Church's Center for Civic and Religious Education has been organizing 
workshops on democracy, civics, and market economics across the island and educating 
people about both the rights and duties of citizenship. 160 The Church issued its strongest 
defense of the dissident community following the arrests of several leaders of Concilio 
Cubano, a coalition of human rights activists. The group had planned a meeting for 24 
February 1996 but many of its leaders were arrested earlier in the month, forcing the 
meeting to be canceled. The Church statement defended "the contribution of diverse 
ideas and initiatives ... [as] a treasure and a recognized right of all citizens."161 The 
158 Ounn Clissold, "Cuba's NOOs," 7. 
159 Malone introduces this concept in "Conflict, Coexistence and Cooperation." 
160 Congress, House of Representatives, International Relations Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere, Church-State Relations in Cuba: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere, 4 March 1998. Shawn T. Malone, "Congressional Testimony on the Papal Visit before the 
House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western 
Hemisphere, " Available [Online] 
<http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/clas/Caribc/testimony.htm>[ 15 April 1998], 1. 
161 Malone, "Conflict, Coexistence, and Cooperation," 8. 
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Cuban Catholic Church also criticized the February 1996 shootdown of two exile planes 
by the Cuban government as "disproportionate and violent and its effects [were] 
devastating for those who maintain moderation as the solution to the crisis."162 
Moreover, the visit of the Pope has further strengthened the church. 
G. THE PAPAL VISIT 
The Papal visit from 21-25 January 1998 marked a sea change (or perhaps See 
change) on various levels of intranational and international relations in Cuba. 
Concerning Church-state relations in Cuba, it provided key gains. In testimony to the 
U.S. Congress regarding changes in Cuba from Pope John Paul II's visit, Shawn Malone, 
a prominent Church scholar, noted that "while no new freedoms were guaranteed, the 
Church gained greater space and a higher profile in Cuban society, both of which are 
important." 163 
Pope John Paul II has been an extraordinary figure in combating communism, and 
contributing to democratic changes in Eastern Europe and South America. While in 
Cuba, the Pope had unprecedented access to the media and routinely called into question 
the validity of the Castro system. The Pontiff cited a Cuban hero and democracy 
advocate saying" [democracy is] the political project best in keeping with human 
nature." 164 
The Pope has already made a difference. In the month following his visit, Cuban 
bishops called for broader discussions with Castro and an increased role for the island's 
needy. They even published a document, "Open Your Hearts to Christ," and were able to 
162 Ibid. 
163 Malone, "Congressional Testimony," 2. 
164 Quoted in Andrew Phillips, "Soul-Searching in Cuba: The Pope Boosts the Church - and 
Castro," Maclean's, 2 February 1998, 38. 
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circulate it inside of Cuba. 165 Cuba also announced the release of 299 prisoners including 
political prisoners. Although human rights organizations had been able to confinn the 
release of a little more than one third by April 1998, this marks a significant contribution 
to civil rights in Cuba. 166 
More recently, the Pope appears to be applying more pressure to Castro. He 
summoned all Cuban bishops to a June 8-14 meeting at the Vatican to evaluate the results 
of the visit to Cuba and the future of relations between the Roman Catholic Church and 
the Cuban government. A Vatican source noted that "this is not an ordinary convocation, 
either in the number ofthe participants or its duration or the circumstances in which it's 
held."· The Vatican further noted that "there are several issues the Cuban government has 
not complied with including a greater opening, a general political amnesty and greater 
space, so the Church can participate in the communications media and other social 
areas." 167 
Following the Vatican meeting, Cuba's Catholic Church urged the Castro 
government to respect all human rights, decried the U.S. trade embargo, and offered itself 
as a mediator for change. A six-page declaration by the Cuban bishops stated "the church 
offers its social doctrine as a framework for stimulating the economy and civil society."I68 
This represents a shift for the Church in which a more combative attitude with the Cuban 
State seems evident. 
Malone adeptly discusses what the Papal visit meant to Cuba. "It created an 
165 "Cuban Bishops Call for Positive Dialogue," Miami Herald, 21 February 1998. 
166 Martin Langfield, "Varied Fruits of Pope's Trip Divide Cuban Exiles," Reuters, 7 April 1998. 
167 Quoted in Pablo Alfonso, "Cuban Bishops to Evaluate Island's Progress," Miami Herald, May 
27, 1998. 
168 Declaration quoted in Juan O. Tamayo, "Cuban Bishops Call for Change," Miami Herald, 30 
May 1998. 
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image ofthe Church as a serious national actor, and an increased familiarity with 
Catholicism among the population. Both of these gains are significant and irrevocable, 
although they cannot really be classified as gains in freedom.,,169 
In sum, the Church has far greater space in Cuba than any other NOO - partly 
because it is much more than a simple NOO - and continues to make gains in this area. It 
has been well supported by a hierarchical structure that has genuine strength both on the 
island and in the international community: "as the most authentic non-governmental 
organization in the country and the only one with strong ties throughout the world, the 
Church is positioned to facilitate peaceful change both within Cuba and in Cuba's 
relations internationally."170 In many ways, the Church has positioned itself as an entity 
that can contribute to the growth of civil society in Cuba and help it flourish. 
H. THE STATE RE-EMERGES 
Despite the many gains non-state actors have made in the last half-decade, the 
state remains dominant and continues to reassert itself against economic and political 
liberalization. Perhaps the most innovative and influential economic NGO has been the 
CEA, an economic think tank. It has been credited with many of the reforms underway 
since the fall of the Soviet Union. However, Raul Castro attacked it in a speech in March 
1996. Subsequently, the former director of the Communist party's public opinion 
institute replaced the head ofCEA, while some ofCEA's most prominent researchers 
have either been reassigned centers or are in limbo.17I 
169 Malone, "Congressional Testimony," 3. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Gonzales, Cuba's Dismal Post-Castro Futures, 4-5. Gonzales notes that the two reformists 
were Julio Carranza and Pedro Monreal who were responsible for writing a "cautiously critical" study of 
the government's move to a mixed economy. 
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To counter the growing private sector, the government has reasserted itself, 
limiting self-employment and attempting to maintain authority and control. There are no 
medium or large private enterprises in Cuba. Cubans still do not have the right to 
maintain private property, one ofthe essential elements of a market economy. Recently, 
the Castro government has reversed course in regard to self-employment and the rolls 
have dropped by more than 30,000 in less than two years. 
These economic reversals and the crackdown on Concilio Cubano are just some 
examples of Castro's ability to maintain state-centered power. Edward Gonzales notes 
that "the Cuban government remains as authoritarian as ever, intolerant of political 
dissent and ready to harass or crush individuals and political groups that criticize or 
challenge it."J72 These fluctuations of state authority and citizen participation represent a 
normal condition of state-society relations and point to the increasing strength of Cuban 
civil society. 
I. AN AVENUE FOR CHANGE? 
Early in this paper, the liberalization process was highlighted as a means toward 
creating a robust civil society and an avenue for democratic transition. It is now 
important to ask whether the emergent Cuban civil society is capable of hastening liberal 
change in a post-Castro Cuba or whether there are too many obstacles in place in Cuba's 
state-centered power structure. A review of some of the changes in the state-civil society 
structure and whether or not these changes support or impede liberalization post-Castro 
should provide a response. These changes are summarized in Table 4.1. 
172 Gonzales, Cuba's Dismal Post-Castro Futures, 5. 
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Table 4.1 Potential for Democratic Transition in a Post-Castro Cuba: Civil Society. 
Potential for 
Civil Liberalization 
Society Impediments to (High, Moderate, 
Sector Support for Liberalization Liberalization Low)'" 
Economic Dollarization, self-employment, No medium or large scale Low 
UBPCs business, no organized 
business groups to 
challenge the state 
Political Increased access to polity No political opposition Low 
through CPs, weakened CDRs allowed, complete 
and state governmental control 
over all means of power 
NGOs The Church, explosive growth Governmental control Moderate 
in NGOs over process and routine 
co-optation 
Masses Homogeneity, Entre Socios Culture of spy-network Moderate 
and fear of state-reprisal 
• High = Factors that contribute to civil society are in place and a post-Castro relationship will 
likely improve trend toward a robust civil society. 
Moderate = Factors that contribute to civil society are not in place but state control may not be 
overcome in a post-Castro transition. 
Low = Factors that contribute to civil society are not in place and the post-Castro state will likely 
impede the growth of civil society. 
1. Economic Liberalization 
Economic liberalization, which has been responsive to societal demands and 
Cuban entrepreneurial spirit has been the most prominent in Cuba since the loss of 
Cuba's Soviet benefactor. Despite the liberalization, the Cuban state maintains 
ownership in virtually every sector of the economy and there strong business groups and 
associations within Cuba that can pose a significant challenge to the state. The economic 
liberalization process creates mechanisms that enhance civil society and will likely 
continue at a stronger pace after Castro. 
2. Political liberalization 
Political liberalization has not occurred at nearly the pace that economic change 
has. Cubans can choose their representation at lower levels of government but only 
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through the measures and candidates determined by the Castro regime. Castro's spy 
network has relaxed its vigilance in recent years, but it still remains. While there are 
seeds of growth in the political aspect of civil society, the current climate remains counter 
to any organized opposition to Castro. Even after Fidel is gone, it will likely take years 
for sufficiently powerful groups to emerge to affect real liberal change. 
3. NGO Growth 
The recent emergence of numerous NGOs is a positive sign for the growth of civil 
society post-Castro but those groups still need the backing of government forces to be 
viable. While access to NGOs is more available now than ever during Castro's reign, 
only the Catholic Church has the ability to challenge state authority to some extent. The 
Church's power has grown since the visit of Pope John Paul II, but it is still not 
significant enough to pose a real challenge Castro. 
4. ~asses 
One aspect ofthe Cuban populace that can help build civil society is seen in entre 
I 
socios. Cuba's homogenous population can also support civil society. Linz and Stepan 
argue that "the more the population of a territory of the state is composed of 
plurinational, lingual, religious, or cultural societies, the more complex politics becomes 
because an agreement on the fundamentals of a democracy will be more difficult.,,173 The 
converse must be true and this cultural similarity bodes well for civil society and 
democratic transition in a post-Castro. 
In sum, the potential for liberalization and the subsequent growth of civil society 
in a post-Castro Cuba is limited. Only the growth of the Church and the potential 
173 Linz and Stepan, 29. 
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available in Cuba's masses bode well for a robust civil society after Castro. 
J. CONCLUSION 
A robust civil society is an important factor in democratic transitions, 
empowering demands placed on the state to provide basic civil liberties. Liberalization in 
the Cuban economy is a necessary condition for democratic change and it has positively 
affected changes in civil society. Cuban NGOs have grown dramatically since the faIl of 
the Soviet Union but Castro has been extremely effective at fragmenting and controlling 
any movements that have been pro-democratic. The Catholic Church, bolstered by the 
visit of Pope John Paul II, appears poised to challenge the state. However, dramatic 
changes are not likely to occur while Fidel Castro is around to combat them with his 
charisma and nationalistic fervor. Despite all the impediments to the growth of civil 
society in Cuba, the populace has made residual gains. While the Cuban people have 
made tremendous strides toward a growing civil society, it is clearly in its infancy and 
must grow and receive tremendous economic and political support from internal and 
external sources if it is to be a factor in Cuban democratization. 
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v. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Just like Cuba's political, economic, and civil societies, Cuba's international 
relations have undergone many changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While 
Castro had attempted to export revolution in the 1970s and early 1980s, he stopped doing 
so in the late 1980s and sought to improve his and Cuba's international standing. Many 
countries are now investing in Cuba, providing a boost to economic society, and civil 
society has been encouraged by the Papal visit. Overall, there has been an opening of 
Castro's Cuba to the international community. Has this opening been a means for Castro 
to maintain control or does it have an impact on liberalization? How important is the 
international factor in democratic transition? What role can the United States play in 
Cuba's transition? How did Pope John Paul II's visit in January 1998 alter Cuba's 
international landscape? The purpose of this chapter is to explore the changes Cuba's 
international relations have undergone since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with a 
primary focus on U.S.-Cuban relations, and determine if these alterations have helped 
pave the way for a transition to democracy after Castro is gone. 
B. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS, TRANSITION, AND DEMOCRACY 
International factors can be identified as foreign governments, international 
organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and other NGOs and their 
collective impact on a country's international relations. 174 There is continuing debate as 
to whether or not international factors can have an impact on democratization and 
174 Geoffrey Pridham, "The International Dimension of Democratization: Theory, Practice, and 
Inter-regional Comparisons," in Building Democracy?: The International Dimension o/Democratization in 
Eastern Europe ed. Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford (New York: St. Martins Press, 
1994), II. 
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liberalization in authoritarian countries.175 Abraham Lowenthal notes that "external 
factors are usually secondary or tertiary in importance in detennining a Latin American 
nation's prospects for democracy .... 176 Geoffrey Pridham argues that, especially in 
regard to Eastern Europe, "it is, however, the contention that any bald relegation of 
external factors to a secondary or subordinate category is too simplistic .... "177 Both 
authors cited how external forces impacted the transitions in Eastern Europe, Southern 
Europe, and Latin America. 
u.S. policy in the last 100 years, and more so since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
has promoted and assisted democratization as one of its main tenets, albeit at differing 
degrees and effectiveness. Abraham Lowenthal draws several conclusions with respect 
to U.S. influence on democratization in Exporting Democracy: The United States and 
Latin America. Prominent conclusions include: 178 
• The U.S. Government has adopted policies to strengthen Latin America's 
prospects for democracy in political and institutional tenns. These efforts have 
been most salient in the Caribbean region and the most distant nations (Argentina 
and Chile). 
• U.S. influence has been more effective when it could be exercised in support of 
local actors and even more so when it backed locally controlled processes and 
institutions rather than specific participants. 
• The capacity of the United States to promote democracy in Latin America is 
greatest where the United States is influential but not overly intrusive. 
175 An in-depth contemporary work is Abraham Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The 
United States and Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). Another 
excellent source is Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford eds., Building Democracy? 
Specific works reviewing U.S.-Cuban relations include Jorge I. Dominguez and Rafael Hernandez, eds. 
U.S. Cuban Relations in the 1990s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989); Jorge I. Dominguez, "U.S.-Cuban 
Relations: From the Cold Wac to the Colder War," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 
(Fall 1997; Dominguez, "Cuba in the International Community in the 1990s: Sovereignty, Human Rights, 
and Democracy," in Tom Facer, ed. Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the 
Americas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
176 Abraham Lowenthal, "Learning from History," in Exporting Democracy, 400. 
177 Pridham, "The International Dimension of Democratization," 9. 
178 Lowenthal, "Preface and Acknowledgments," ix, and "Learning from History," 398-401. 
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• U.S. business and organized labor have had an impact in Latin America; and U.S. 
economic policies have also played a key role in Latin democratization. 
Three substantial inferences can be drawn with regard to external actors and 
democracy. First, international forces can play in role in democratization. It is probably 
not as important as the roles political, economic, and civil societies play within a nation, 
but external forces can have a dramatic effect on the key elements that facilitate 
transitions to democracy. Second, the United States in particular has an ability to affect 
transition. The U.S. position is uniquely strong in Latin America and has been bolstered 
by the fall of the Soviet Union. Third, international actors can have an impact on 
transitions especially in today's increasingly economically interdependent world. 
Pridham insightfully summarizes his work noting that it "more than confirms the initial 
view that the international dimension is a principal component of the democratization 
process ... .It is turning out to be a crucial condition of success."I79 
C. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS THE CUBAN HISTORICAL CASE 
The importance of international factors in Cuba is evinced by its history. 
Christopher Columbus discovered Cuba in 1492 and his son settled it in 1511. Cuba 
remained under Spanish rule for the next four centuries, despite some Cuban rebellion 
and a brief period of British occupation in the eighteenth century. ISO U.S. forces defeated 
the Spanish in 1898 and Spain relinquished control of Cuba. Cuban independence was 
declared in 1902 approximately 80 years after the rest of Spain's colonies revolted. 
Almost immediately after Cuban independence, the United States enacted the Platt 
Amendment. Under Platt, Cuba became a U.S. protectorate and the Cuban constitution 
179 Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford, "Introduction," in Building Democracy?, 5. 
180 Free Cuba Foundation, "Brief History of Cuba." Available [Online] 
<http://www.fiu.edu/--fct:'histcuba.html> [1 June 1998]. 
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was amended to allow U.S. intervention to protect "life, property, and individual liberty" 
in Cuba. U.S. forces intervened in Cuba seven times over the next 32 years.1B1 
In 1934, U.S. abolished the Platt Amendment. Fulgencio Batista gained control 
of Cuba in 1934 and ruled through 1940. In 1940, a Cuban constitution was established 
and Batista was elected as president. 182 
In June 1944, Batista permitted free elections, which were won by Raul Grau San 
Martin who defeated Batista's candidate Carlos Saladrigas. Grau was later defeated in 
1948 by Carlos Prio Socarras. Cuba's 12 years of democracy ended in 1952, with Batista 
establishing a military dictatorship and suspending the constitution. 1S3 
In 1959, Fidel Castro came to power forcing Batista to flee. From 1959-1991, the 
United States, Cuba, and the Soviet Union played an important role in the Cold War 
including the Bay of Pigs failure and the Cuban Missile Crisis. l84 Presently, the United 
States and Cuba remain antagonistic. 
International relationships have also been important from a Cuban perspective. 
The 1976 Cuban constitution acknowledged the fraternal friendship and the assistance 
and cooperation of the Soviet Union. ISS A new constitution was written in 1992, which 
retains a significant commitment to internationalism that is "unusual for constitutions in 
the world today."186 This international role is founded in Article 12. 
Article 12 describes the "principles on which Cuba bases its international 
lSI Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Leslie Bethell, "From the Second World War to the Cold War: 1944-1954," in Exporting 
Democrafl:, 43, 45, 55-56. 
14 Close Up Foundation "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba." Available [Online] 
<http://www.closcup.org/cuba.htm#timcline> [31 January 1998]. 
I8S Dominguez, "Cuba in the 1990s," in Beyond Sovereignty, 300. 
186 Ibid. 
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relations and includes international cooperation, and the peaceful resolution of disputes 
based on equality and respect." More importantly, Cuba's international relations are 
based on ''the other principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and other 
international treaties to which Cuba is a party." Article 12 also focuses on the key role 
the rest of Latin America plays on Cuba's international landscape focusing on a common 
identity and a basis for economic and political integration to achieve genuine 
independence ... especially those from Latin America and the Caribbean.,,187 
In sum, three important points can be considered regarding international influence 
and democracy in Cuban history. First, international actors have virtually always played 
a role in Cuba and the Cuban Polity recognizes this influence. Second, the key player in 
Cuba's modem era has been the United States. Third, Cuba has had only one period of 
democracy in its history, and this was about two generations ago, leaving very little 
memory of democracy and democratic institutions on the island. 
D. KEY INTERNATIONAL ACTORS 
There are many significant actors that can affect the Cuban transition. Each of 
these external forces plays a role in the political, economic, and civil landscape of Cuba 
today and will likely gain in importance after Castro. As has been shown, the key 
international player is the United States. The rest ofthe international community also has 
a role in Cuba with Latin America, Spain (as the key actor in Europe), and Canada in 




1. The United States 
For nearly 40 years, the U.S. policy toward Castro and Cuba has been designed to 
bring about change on the island, with the essential objective being the departure of 
Castro. Part of the tough stance U.S. policy makers have taken has been to mollify the 
powerful Cuban American community. Nevertheless, the United States has an infamous 
history in Cuba and would like to see Castro gone and democracy take hold. In fact, "the 
overarching goal of American policy must be to promote a peaceful transition to 
democracy on the island."188 The United States has focused most of its efforts on the 
political and economic arena of Cuba with various tools in place to attempt to affect 
change. 
a. The Embargo 
The cornerstone of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been the economic 
embargo which is designed to affect all aspects of Cuban society. In response to Cuba's 
expropriation of approximately $2 billion of U.S. properties, President Kennedy issued 
Presidential Proclamation No. 3447, entitled "Embargo on Trade with Cuba." The 
proclamation established an embargo upon trade between the United States and Cuba 
effective on February 7, 1962.189 
The embargo has been detrimental to both U.S. and Cuban economies, but 
much more devastating to Cuba. If the embargo were to be lifted, annual trade between 
188 Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, Statement of Michael Ranneberger. 
Coordinator for Cuban Affairs Bureau for Inter-American Affairs. before the Subcommittee on Trade. The 
House Ways and Means Committee, 7 May 1998. Available [Online] 
<http://www .slate.goviwww!policLremarksI1998/980507 _ranneberger _ cuba.hlml> [15 May 1998]. 
189 "Chronology of Cuban Affairs," ] 958-1998 Released by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 
January 12, ]998. Available [Online] http://www.stale.gov/www/regioru;!ara/cubu_chronology.html [4 
May 1998]. 
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the United States and Cuba has been estimated to range from $3 billion to $7 billion, with 
perhaps, 70 percent being exports from the United States. 190 
The embargo has been strengthened by two pieces oflegislation in the 
1990s, The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (Torricelli Bill or CDA) and The Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton or Libertad Act). The 
CDA seeks "a peaceful transition to democracy and the resumption of economic growth 
in Cuba through the careful application of sanctions directed at the Castro government 
and support for the Cuban people.,,191 The CDA condemns Castro's human rights 
violations, calls for an end to military assistance to Cuba from all nations, encourages 
free and fair elections in Cuba and is "prepared to reduce sanctions .. .in response to 
positive developments in Cuba." The CDA also authorizes the President to impose 
sanctions against countries that assist Cuba. 192 
Section 1705, or Track II, of the CDA is meant to support the Cuban 
people. It allows for humanitarian shipments of food and medicine to individual Cubans 
and NGOs, expands telecommunication ties to the island, and supports those 
organizations and individuals that advocate democratic change on the island. 193 
The Libertad Act is more condemning of the Castro Regime than the 
CDA. The stated purposes ofthe Libertad Act are to assist the Cuban people in regaining 
freedom and prosperity; to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro regime; 
provide for U.S. security in the face of continuing threats from the Castro government; to 
190 Testimony of John Kavulich to the Congress, House, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.-
Cuban Trade and Economic Council, before the Subcommittee on Trade Committee on Ways and Means, 7 
May 1998. Available [Online] <http://www.cubatrade.orglcongl'e55.html> [1 June 1998]. 
191 The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, sec. 3 (1992). 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid., sec. 1705. 
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encourage free and fair elections in Cuba; to provide a policy framework for the U.S. in 
response to a freely elected or transitional government in Cuba; and to protect U.S. 
nationals against the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime. 194 
The Libertad Act attempts to accomplish these goals through four specific titles: 
• Title I is designed to strengthen international sanctions against the Castro 
government. It does this through the enforcement of sanctions, prohibition against 
indirect financing of Cuba, opposing Cuban membership in international financial 
organizations, urging the President to impose sanctions on countries assisting Cuba. 195 
• Title II is designed to provide assistance to a free and independent Cuba. It outlines a 
policy for a transitional government in Cuba, assistance for the Cuban people and the 
Cuban military, and lays out requirements for lifting the embargo which requires 
congressional action. Title II also outlines the policies for settling outstanding claims 
to confiscated property in Cuba. 196 
• Title III is meant to protect the property rights ofU. S. nationals and authorizes civil 
action against those trafficking in confiscated U.S. property. Presidential authority 
can suspend this section for 6-month periods and suspension has occurred since the 
Libertad Act was enacted. 197 
• Title N builds on Title III by barring non-U.S. citizens who have confiscated 
property or traffic in such property from entry into the U.S. 198 Title III and IV of the 
Libertad Act have been the most controversial and have energized international actors 
against the U.S. policies. 
Other U.S. policies aimed at Cuba include funding for the United States 
Information Agency's Radio and TV Marti, both of which transmit programs aimed at 
bringing democracy to Cuba. Radio Marti began its broadcasts in May 1985. It has aired 
programs to encourage Cubans to spoil ballots in national elections and interviews with 
members of the exile community eager to return to Cuba. It also broadcasts programs 
aimed at Cuban workers that explain how to change conditions in Cuba. The U.S. also 
194 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, sec 2, 3(1996). 
195 Ibid., Title I. 
196 Ibid., Title II. 
197 Ibid., Title III. 
198 Ibid., Title IV. 
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funds several human rights and democratic organizations designed to improve civil 
society arenas in Cuba, such as the Cuban Committee for Human Rights and the Center 
for Cuban Democracy. 199 
h. Policy Changes 
Before the Libertad Act was instituted, U.S.-Cuban relations began to 
thaw chiefly concerning the migration issue. There have been three significant mass 
migrations from Cuba to the United States, one in 1965, one in 1980, and one in 1994. 
The 1994 migration was particularly important because it forced U.S. and Cuban officials 
into negotiations. In September 1994, the U.S. and Cuba agreed to take measures to 
ensur~ that migration between the two countries was safe, legal, and orderly. The U.S. 
agreed that total legal migration to America would be a minimum of20,000 per year. In 
May 1995, the U.S. and Cuba reached another agreement which dealt specifically with 
Cubans interdicted at sea. Under this accord, Cubans interdicted at sea or who entered 
the Guantanamo Naval Base illegally were to be returned to Cuba provided that they did 
not have any legitimate protection concerns. The United States Interests Section in 
Havana does follow-ups with returned migrants to check on those concerns.lOO Meetings 
between U.S. and Cuban officials continue on a bi-annual basis. 
More recently, President Clinton made three significant changes to Cuban 
policy on 20 March 1998. The policy changes streamlined and expedited the issuance of 
licenses for the sale of medical supplies to Cuba. They allowed for the resumption of 
direct humanitarian charter flights to Cuba from the U.S. and restored arrangements to 
199 Tom Barry, ed. "Evaluating U.S. Democratization Policy on Cuba." The Democracy 
Backgrounder (Vol. I, No.3), September 1995. Available [Online] 
<http://zianct.com/irc)/dbv)n3cu.html> [I5 April 1998], 4. 
200 "Chronology of Cuban Affairs." 
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permit Cuban-American families to send remittances to their relatives in Cuba (up to 
$300 per quarter).201 
c. U.S.-Cuban Relations in the International Arena 
Two aspects of U.S.-Cuban relations gain international attention annually, 
Cuba's human rights record and the embargo. In 1988, the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission (UNHCR) sent a special delegation to Cuba to look into human rights 
conditions. Castro cooperated with this delegation but refused to do so on subsequent 
visits. In 1992, the UNHCR appointed a special rapporteur who found ample evidence of 
substantial human rights violations in Cuba. In December 1997, the UN General 
Assembly adopted a resolution which "[deplored], the arbitrary arrest, detention and 
harassment of Cuban citizens, in particular members of the Dissident Working Group and 
the independent press, for peacefully seeking to exercise their civil and political rights."lol 
The General assembly also pointed to the U.S. embargo as factor which exacerbated the 
human rights issue in Cuba. 
In April 1998, however, the UNHCR declined to condemn Castro's 
Human Rights for the first time since 1991. The vote was 19-16 with 18 abstentions. 
The Chilean foreign minister, in a statement which likely echoed the sentiments of other 
international actors, noted: "in Cuba, it is necessary to open a dialogue, a debate, and the 
proposed resolution just slammed the door on what has already been done.,,203 
201 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Opening Remarks on Cuba at Press Briefmg 
followed by Question and Answer Session by other Administration Officials," (Washington, D.C., March 
20, 1998), As released by the Office of the Spokesman U.S. Department of State. Available [Online] 
http://secretary.state.gov!www/statements/1998/980320.html [4 May 1998]. 
202 United Nations, General Assembly, Situation of Human Rights in Cuba, 12 December 1997, 
Resolution 52/143. Available [Online] <http://www.ullhchr.ch:hlmltmenu4/gares/garesI43.htm> [I June 
1998]. 
203 Referenced in Susan Candiotti, "Cuban Dissidents Uneasy after UN Vote: Measure 
Condemning Human Rights Record Fails in World Body," CNN World News 23 April 1998. Available 
[Online] <hltp:l!europe.cnn.com:WORLD/americas!9804!23!cuba.un.ap!illdex.hlml> [I June 1998]. 
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In 1992, Cuba introduced a measure to the UN General Assembly calling 
upon the U.S. government to end the embargo. The General Assembly condemned the 
embargo by a vote of 59 to 3, with 71 abstentions. The resolution, though non-binding, 
has been approved by the General Assembly each subsequent year. The October 1998 
vote was 157 to 2, with 11 abstentions. Most of our allies including the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and every Latin American Nation voted in favor of condemning the embargo: 
"according to one diplomat from a friendly country to the United States, the Cubans did 
not even have to lead the fight."204 
In sum, U.S. policies have been sharply focused on Cuban political 
society, while generally holding economic society hostage, and have ultimately been 
confrontational. A few U.S. policies have targeted civil society but these too have chiefly 
been antagonistic. International actors have viewed the U.S. approach negatively, as 
shown in the UN votes. Recently, America's policies toward Cuba have softened and 
could playa less combative role with respect to Cuban political, economic, and civil 
society. Regardless of Washington's stance toward Cuba, the United States will surely 
playa major role in a Cuban transition. 
2. Latin America 
"One of Cuban foreign policy's main achievements in the 1980s was the re-
establishment of diplomatic relations with the major countries of Latin America; Cuba 
thus broke with more than two decades of almost complete isolation within the 
hemisphere (the exception was Mexico, which never cut ties with Cuba)."20s Castro 
204 Quoted in YoussefM. Ibrahim, "UN Votes, 157-2 in Nonbinding Referendum Against U.S. 
embargo of Cuba," New York Times, 15 October 1998. 
20S Boris H. Yopo, "Latin American Perspectives on the Cuban Transition," The Georgetown 
University Caribbean Project's Cuba Briefmg Paper Series (Number 3, July 1993). Available [Online] 
<http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/clas/Caribelbp3.htm>[12 June 1998], l. 
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began to roll back his policy of exporting revolution. In return, many Latin governments 
began to normalize relations with Cuba. "In effect, after this step was taken, Cuba 
became a domestic and foreign policy issue of secondary importance for the countries of 
the region."z06 
Latin American no longer saw Cuba as a threat because Havana had stopped 
exporting revolution, and it was no longer a valid model for socialist movements. This 
was due to "Cuba's long dependence on the Soviet subsidies, its inefficient economy, and 
its rejection of pluralist democracy .... "207 
Latin nations now are more concerned about a peaceful transition in Cuba and the 
.. 
dangers a violent change could impose on them: 
From a Latin American perspective, the key issue now is how to 
facilitate a gradual and peaceful transition with minimal foreign 
interference in Cuba. Many Latin American governments, especially 
those that share the same geographical space with Cuba (that us, the 
Caribbean Basin), are worried that turmoil in Cuba could create 
regional instability and domestic crisis in their respective countries, so 
for them Cuba has become a problem of national security.20B 
In accord with the recent Latin American stance virtually every Latin nation has 
reestablished ties with Cuba. 
In regard to Helms-Burton Act, the Latin American nations have also sided with 
Cuba, often condemning Helms-Burton. Mexico's reaction in particular provided 
increased alliances with Cuban polity. The Mexican congress condemned Helms-Burton 
as illegal and they reaffirmed Mexico's "solidarity with the Cuban People" instructing the 
Mexican Government to carry out joint actions with other countries.209 
206 Ibid., 3 
207 Ibid., 4 
208 Ibid., 7 
209 Joaquin Roy, "The Helms-Burton Law: Development, Consequences, and Legacy for Inter-




Spain and Cuba share a special relationship based on cultural heritage and a 
common language. The Cuban issue in Spanish politics is nearly as charged as it is in 
Miami. Spain has consistently been one of Cuba's largest trading partners, and Spanish 
businesses are heavily invested in Cuba. 
In 1993, a team of experts led by former economics minister, Carlos Solchaga, 
was sent to Cuba to assess the economic situation and advise the Cuban government. 
Solchaga became an adviser to Castro and has been recognized as a key component of the 
market reforms in Cuba.210 In addition to encouraging the Cubans to make deeper and 
more rapid economic reforms, Spain has also pressured Havana to allow greater political 
pluralism and to respect human rights. The Spanish embassy in Havana closely tracks 
individual cases of political imprisonment and often lobbies hard for the release of such 
prisoners. 211 
Cuban relations with Spain soured when Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria 
Aznar took office in 1996 and began to take a hard line toward relations with Castro. 
Aznar was a key figure in achieving European Union support for demands that Castro 
introduce democratic reforms. Castro rejected the Spanish Ambassador in 1996 when the 
ambassador told reporters that he would welcome Cuban dissidents at the Spanish 
embassy. The post was left vacant for 16 months but a replacement was named in April 
210 "A Crash Course in Economics," The Economist, 6 April 1996, S5. 
211 Gabriel A. Ondetti, "Western European and Canadian Relations with Cuba after the Cold 
War," The Georgetown University Caribbean Project's Cuba Briefing Paper Series (Number 9, November 
1995). A vailable [Online] <http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/clas/Cacibe/bp9.htm>[ 15 April 
1998],5. 
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1998. Aznar noted that "it reflects the nonnalizing of relations ... ."212 In addition, King 
Juan Carlos is expected to visit Cuba sometime in 1999. 
4. Canada 
Canada has probably been the most significant actor in Cuba outside of the United 
States. Canada has taken various initiatives to try to expand Cuba's economic opening 
and improve its commercial and political ties on the island. Canada has been harsh in its 
criticism of the U.S. embargo and the Libertad Act, but also of Castro's human rights 
record. Canadian business executives are heavily involved in Cuba's mining, oil, tourist, 
and electrical industries. Additionally, they have been key in bringing western-style 
management practices to Cuba.213 
The relationship between the two countries was recently highlighted by Canadian 
Prime Minister Jean Chretien's two-day visit to Cuba in April 1998 after having been 
invited by Castro. This was the first visit by a Canadian head of government since Prime 
Minister Pierre Trudeau in 1976.214 
Chretien was not there to coddle Castro; he told reporters that Castro "has to 
change." Chretien's visit yielded some important precedents including the live broadcast 
on state-run television of his airport arrival speech, his open meeting with the head of 
Cuba's Catholic Church, and talks with several independent NGOs. Chretien appealed to 
Castro to free four leading dissidents jailed without trial. Essentially, Canada has 
212 Quoted in Kernan Turner, "Spain Names Ambassador to Cuba," The Associated Press, 2 April 
1998. 
2J3 William C. Symmonds, Gail De George, and Gail Reed. "Castro's Capitalist," Business Week 
International Number 3518 (March 17, 1997). 
214 "Canada's Chretien Visits Cuba," Reuters, April 26 1998. 
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followed an engagement policy which it feels is more effective than the U.S. road. 21 
To illustrate the importance of Canada, Spain, and the countries of Latin America 
in Cuba, Table 5.1 shows how significant they have been in Cuba's economic recovery. 
Together, they account for more than two-thirds of the investment in Cuba. 
Table 5.1 Amount of pledged and delivered investments in Cuba from selected areas 
since 1990 (in millions of doUars.)* 
Country or Area 
Canada 
Latin America t 
Spain 














* Source: U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, "Foreign Investment and the Republic of 
Cuba." Available [Online] http://www.cubatrade.orgfforeign.html [I June 1998]. 
t The Latin American nations include Brazil, Chile, The Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela 
To summarize, the international community has followed three policies to affect 
change in Cuba. First, economic liberalization is expected to lead to greater political 
freedom. Second, open dialogue is more effective than confrontation and isolation. 
Third, the embargo promotes chaos, not peaceful change.216 Canada, Spain, and Latin 
Nations have been able to have a liberalizing impact on Cuban economic, civil, and 
political society. 
s. The Catholic Church 
The Catholic Church is the another critical actor in Cuba. Because of its role as 
an independent element of Cuban society, the Catholic Church has the unique ability to 
215 Quoted in "Canada's Chretien tells Castro to Change," Reuters, 28 April 1998. The four 
dissidents Felix Roque, Vladimiro Roca, Felix Bonne and Rene Gomez Manzano were detained July 16, 
1997 after openly calling for democratic reforms in Cuba's one-party communist system. See Andrew 
Cawthorne, "Canadian Plea Buoys Cuba prisoners' families," Reuters 27 April 1998 
216 Ondetti, "Western European and Canadian Relations with Cuba after the Cold War," 10-1 I. 
95 
affect change from within Cuba as well as in the international realm. The Church has 
recently gained importance in Cuba because of the visit of the Pope in January 1998. 
As pointed out in Chapter N, since 1991 the Church has taken on a strong role in 
attempting to force change in Cuba. It has been prominent in calling for reconciliation 
with exile groups, has publicly decried the state's control of the media, and has 
challenged governmental policies regarding human rights. 
The Papal visit from 21-25 January 1998 also provided the church greater space 
and a higher profile in Cuban society. The Pope has already made a difference. In the 
month following his visit, Cuban bishops called for broader discussions with Castro and 
an increased role for the island's needy. They even published a document, "Open Your 
Hearts to Christ," and were able to circulate it inside ofCuba.217 Cuba also announced 
the release of 299 prisoners including political prisoners. Although human rights 
organizations had been able to confirm the release of a little more than one third by April 
1998, this marks a significant contribution to civil rights in Cuba.218 
Catholic charities have poured in $25 million in humanitarian assistance to Cuba 
over the past five years and are now moving to expend their work, according to the chief 
of the Latin American section of Caritas. The increased work includes providing classes 
to and extending credits to small-business entrepreneurs. "In the past we have supervised 
aid, now it's time to move ahead. There's a new reality."219 
On the whole, the Church has a tremendous ability to affect Cuban society 
internally and externally. The Church has shown its ability to reach political, economic, 
217 "Cuban Bishops Call for Positive Dialogue," Miami Herald, 21 February 1998. 
218 Martin Langfield, "Varied Fruits of Pope's Trip Divide Cuban Exiles," Reuters, 7 April 1998. 
219 Quoted in Victor L. Simpson, "Vatican Sees Advances in Cuba," The Associated Press, 17 
April 1998. 
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and civil society in Cuba with greater impact and access than other institutions. The 
Church is uniquely "positioned to facilitate peaceful change both within Cuba and in 
Cuba's relations internationally."llo 
E. AN AVENUE FOR CHANGE? 
Earlier in this chapter, the importance of international actors on democratization 
was outlined. In all transitions, national sovereignty must be acquired before 
international players can make a lasting difference: " ... the consolidation of national 
sovereignty is a precondition for the implantation of a representative democracy .... For a 
government to be securely democratic, it must establish its authority and policy 
effectiveness throughout the national territory, and must secure international acceptance 
of that authority."221 Fidel Castro has achieved Cuban sovereignty over the past four 
decades and has surely consolidated it in the 1990s. Jorge I. Dominguez correctly asserts 
that "Cuba affirms its national sovereignty more than its Marxism-Leninism and the 
inclusiveness of nationality more than to class politics.,,222 With national sovereignty not 
in doubt, international actors can make a difference in Cuba. 
Cuba has undertaken progressive reforms in key political, economic, and civil 
areas since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While many of these changes have been 
implemented to maintain the current regime, the international community has had some 
impact. International actors can make a difference in Cuba, but how much can they 
affect in Cuba after Castro? External factors will play an important role in Cuba after 
Castro as summarized in Table 5.2 
220 Malone, "Congressional Testimony" 
221 Laurence Whitehead, "The Imposition of Democracy," in Exporting Democracy, 239. 
221 Dominguez, "Cuba in the 1990s," 30 I. 
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Support for Liberalization 
Foreign investment, joint 
ventures, Cuban economic 
liberalization 
Reintegration into the 
international community, 
collapse of communism 
Opening to the Church and 
other international players, 




The u.s. embargo, 
Cuba's statist policies 
U.s.-Cuba relations 
The radical portion of 
the exile community, 






Low to Moderate 
Moderate 
* High = International factors that contribute to liberalization are in place and a post-Castro 
relationship will likely improve trend toward democratization. 
Moderate = International factors that contribute to liberalization are in place but state control may 
not be overcome in a post-Castro transition. 
Low = International factors that contribute to liberalization are not in place and the post-Castro 
state will likely impede an increasing trend for democratization. 
1. Political Society 
In the international arena, Cuba has ceased exporting revolution and aggressively 
pursued acceptance in the international community. Havana has sought to engage 
Canada, the countries of Latin America, and Western Europe. Castro has allowed foreign 
representatives such as the Pope and Prime Minister Chretien public access and accepted 
mild criticism. Castro has worked hard to isolate U.S. policy in the international arena 
and has gained support from a multitude of international actors in condemning it. Prior to 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba was one of the states that disrupted world relations 
and prided itself as a leader of the Nonaligned Movement. Today, Cuba maintains 
diplomatic relations with 164 countries.223 
223 U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. "Realities of MarketCuba." Available [Online] 
<http://www.cubatrade.org/market.html> [I June 1998]. 
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2. Economic Society 
International actors have been essential in Cuba's economic liberalization. 
Cuba's ambitious Foreign Investment Law of 1995 opened broad areas of the Cuban 
economy to the international market. The policies of reintegration, expanded trade, joint 
ventures, and free trade zones are truly positive features that portend further market 
reforms. In fact, there are more than 330 joint ventures operating in Cuba and total 
foreign investment exceeds $1.5 billion.224 Havana is required to maintain a course of 
economic liberalization to stave off the collapse of its economy, political unrest, and to 
ensure regime survival. Cuba's austere fiscal policy has opened a path for reformers and 
has helped to create a framework for market-oriented policies. Privatization in land, 
labor, and industry, though limited, is gaining influence and will playa vital role in 
transformation to a market economy. Economic involvement from forces outside of 
Cuba has had the greatest impact toward market reforms and will continue to do so after 
Castro. 
3. Civil Society 
The Church's power has grown since the visit of Pope John Paul II, and while not 
strong enough yet to pose a significant challenge to Castro, it has bolstered civil society 
in Cuba. The changes in Cuba's relations with other countries has promoted ties between 
civil groups and individuals that can only help to promote the strengthening of civil 
society. Policy changes in the U.S. allowing for increased remittances and greater 
communication can also serve to enhance political society by providing greater 
information and wealth, which will in turn help support economic society. 
224 Ibid. 
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A danger is posed to Cuban civil society from the more radical elements ofthe 
Cuban exile community who maintain a vigorous hatred of Fidel and want to return to 
Cuba and reclaim property. Additionally, this group could serve to foment discord in 
Cuba's civil society because many ofthem were wealthy when they left Cuba. 
Ramifications could also be felt in race relations because much of the exile community is 
white. 
F. CONCLUSION 
A transition to democracy in Cuba after Castro is hardly a foregone conclusion. 
International actors, with the exception of the United States, appear poised and ready to 
usher in market liberalization which they hope will help transform the political arena in 
Cuba and support the ever-growing civil arena. U.S. policy regarding Cuba has been 
softening recently and will likely do so at an increased pace after Castro. 
International forces have had a positive impact in the democratic transitions that 
have occurred in the last three decades. While international forces cannot be the key 
instruments of democratic change in Cuba, they have tremendous resources and 
experience in transition and instituting democratic norms. International institutions can 
provide a guide for the political, economic, and civil society actors within Cuba that will 
affect change after Castro. In today's interdependent political and economic world, 
international forces, and the United States specifically, are sure to play an important role 
in liberalizing Cuba after Castro. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary focus ofthis thesis has been the transition path on which Cuba has 
been since the collapse of the Soviet Union in four key arenas. Liberalization has been 
emphasized because it almost always precedes democracy. The arenas were examined to 
find what levels ofliberalization, if any, have occurred since Cuba began its transition. 
Table 6.1 summarizes the findings in this thesis and shows the potential for democratic 
transition in a post-Castro Cuba. 









Support for Democratic 
Transition 
National sovereignty, mass 
participation, increased access 
electoral process, institution 
of the FAR and their 
acceptance of civilian control 
Liberalization in trade, 
privatization, fiscal refonn, 
entrepreneurship 
Homogeneity, increased 
access to polity through CPs; 
weakened state; Catholic 
Church, NGOs 
Foreign Investment, 
reintegration into the 
international community, 
opening to the Church, recent 
U.S. policy change 
Impediments to 
Democratic Transition 
No organized parties, 
Castro legacy, single party 
domination without 
institutional nonns, 
involvement of military in 
political process 
Poor credit market, high 
public expenditures, no 
property rights, no large 
private enterprise 
Governmental control over 
all means of power; culture 
of fear 
The radical portion of the 
exile community The U.S. 














• High = Factors for liberalization are in place and will bring about dramatic change post-Castro 
Moderate = Factors for liberalization are in place but not sufficiently so to bring about dramatic 
change post-Castro 
Low = Factors for liberalization are not sufficiently in place to bring about dramatic change post-
Castro. 
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1. Political Society 
The overall prospects for democratic transition in Cuban political society are low. 
Main hindrances include the lack of an organized and institutionalized party system, the 
complete domination of political society by the Castro brothers and the Communist Party, 
and certain military prerogatives, such as the FAR's role in politics and the Cuban 
Economy. 
Not all is bad for political society, however. Some liberalization has occurred in 
the national electoral system that was put in place in response to societal demands. 
Despite their involvement in the political process, the Cuban military also appears to be a 
moderating force because of their position as a strong institution. They have supported 
market-oriented changes, and have accepted civilian control. Most importantly, Cuba has 
established national sovereignty, a prerequisite for democracy. 
2. Economic Society 
The prospects for liberalization and democratization in the Cuban economy are 
moderate to high. Many positive changes have occurred in the Cuban economy since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. There is greater access to foreign capital, privatization has 
occurred at many levels of society, and the Cuban entrepreneurial spirit are all aspects 
that support greater freedoms. This increased liberalization can help bolster civil society 
and the two arenas can make further gains from the state. 
On the down side, Cuba remains a mostly statist economy, has little access to 
capital, and a large portion of their budget is devoted to social programs. Also, there is 
no means for citizens to hold private property and no medium or large enterprises that 
can wrest substantial gains in liberalization from political society. 
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3. Civil Society 
Civil Society in Cuba remains in its infancy. Gains have been made in access to 
the governmental process, the creation ofNGOs, and the renewed involvement ofthe 
Catholic Church. The homogeneity of Cuban society bodes well for the development of 
a robust civil society after Castro. 
Yet, the state remains very strong in Cuba. They maintain virtually all the means 
of control in society and have been able to limit societal gains, or at least co-opt them. 
The culture of fear that Castro has created will remain a legacy after he is gone. Overall, 
the prospects for a democratic transition in civil society are low to moderate. 
4. International Factors 
International factors have been playing a positive role in liberalizing Cuban 
economic society and supporting growth in Cuban civil society. The visit of the Pope in 
January 1998 was a watershed event that can help Cuban civil society and pressure 
political society into change. Cuba appears committed to its reintegration of Cuba into 
the international community. Some recent V.S. policy initiatives appear to be helping 
civil and economic society. 
The V.S. embargo of Cuba still is a great hindrance to the prospects for liberal 
transition. In many ways it limits the growth of economic society and provides Castro a 
convenient scapegoat for his economic problems. The radical elements ofthe exile 
community could also be a negative factor in Cuba's transition, especially if they are 
determined to regain expropriated property. Overall, international factors have a 
moderate chance of supporting democratic transition in Cuba. 
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B. TESTING THE THEORY 
At the onset of this thesis, a theory was proposed which hypothesized that 
democratic transition and consolidation is based on key political arenas and paths toward 
liberalization and change. The argument presented here took that theory, adding the 
arena of international factors, to determine what outcomes may be possible in a post-
Castro Cuba. 
Table 6.2 is presentation of a comparison of Linz and Stepan's findings 
concerning democratic consolidation and the findings for Cuba's prospects for 
democratic transition after Castro in this thesis. Although Linz and Stepan focus their 
work on democratic consolidation, their hypothesis and conclusions can be easily 
transferred when analyzing democratic transition. A critical factor in determining 
transitional outcomes is their prior regime type and the path that country follows toward 
change. In Cuba's case, their regime type best fits into the Linz and Stepan category of 
post-totalitarian.225 
Table 6.2 Comparison of Linz and Stepan Implications of Prior Non-democratic 






Linz and Stepan Implications 
for Democratic Consolidation 
Low 
Low to Medium 
Low to Medium 
Not analyzed 
Prospects for Democratic 
Transition in Post-Castro Cuba 
Low 
Medium to High 
Low to Medium 
Medium 
Source: Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Consolidation, 56. 
225 Linz and Stepan discuss four types of regime types: authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian 
and Sultanism. While Cuba exhibits elements of all of these regime types, it best fits into the post-
totalitarian category. This is because there are reformers and reforms in Cuba and political space has been 
created by and for economic and political society. See Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Consolidation, 38-65. 
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When comparing the conclusions in this thesis with Linz and Stepan's only the 
prospects for transition of economic society standout. This likely stems from the 
importance of the current-day world economy and the emphasis placed on international 
factors in this thesis, whereas Linz and Stepan virtually ignore them. 
C. IT IS TIME TO COME IN FROM THE COLD: U.S. STRATEGY FOR 
CUBA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
The research presented here has implications for current U.S. policy which, if 
followed, could lead to a smoother transition in Cuba after Castro. As pointed out in 
Chapter V, U.S.-Cuban relations have been antagonistic since Castro came to power. 
The most notable incidents were the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Other 
disasters include the mass migrations from Cuba in 1965, 1980 and 1994. This 
relationship, an anachronism, still exists almost ten years after the collapse of the Berlin 
wall as the last vestige of the Cold War. 
Since the watershed events ofthe 1960s, Castro has continually emboldened 
himself, his revolution, and Cuban nationalism; often in direct political conflict with the 
U.S. Castro has portrayed the United States as an evil nation, bent upon destroying the 
virtues of the revolution, and can point to acts by the U.S. such as the Bay of Pigs or the 
embargo as empirical facts to support his proposition. 
Without rehashing all of U.S. policy, it is fair to say that policies such as the 
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (Torricelli Bill or CDA) and the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton or Libertad Act) have served to 
exacerbate U.S.- Cuban relations. Arguably, these policies have done more to prop up 
Castro than to bring about democratic change in Cuba and appear to run counter to the 
U.S. National Security Strategy of engagement. Recent policy initiatives that seek to 
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provide humanitarian assistance,' allow for travel and cash remittances are on the right 
track in promoting peaceful change in Cuba but do not go far enough. If the United 
States is going to playa role in the democratization of Cuba, it must be part of a system 
already in place. If the United States continues to try to change Cuba from the outside, 
the Cuban people will reject U.S. interference when Castro is gone. 
D. POLICY OPTIONS 
In essence, there are two policy options available to decision-makers; maintain or 
lift the embargo. Arguments in favor of lifting the embargo are naturally the contrary 
arguments for the maintenance of the embargo. Table 6.3 lists some of the most 
prominent arguments for lifting and maintaining the embargo. 
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Table 6.3 Arguments for Lifting or Maintaining the U.S. Embargo of Cuba 
Item Lift the Embal"!o Maintain the Embar!o 
1 The embargo is morally wrong Lifting the embargo absolves Castro of his crimes: 
because it punishes the Cuban people theft of U.S. property, murder, and human/civil 
and not the Castro government. rights violations of the Cuban people. 
2 The policy is hypocritical; the U.S. Business dealings in Cuba are de jure dealings 
trades with Vietnam and China, Why with Castro. Countries that currently trade with 
not Cuba? Moreover, the embargo is Cuba are required to pay Castro's government for 
ineffective, Cuba continues to trade their employees. Castro pays laborers poorly and 
with numerous countries. keeps the rest to prop up his regime. 
3 The embargo is a relic of the Cold Castro poses a threat because he is obsessively 
War and is senseless because Castro anti-American, anti-democratic, has fomented 
poses no threat to the U.S .. revolution in the past, can and has unleashed 
migration warfare against America 
4 The embargo has failed for nearly 40 Continued economic pressure will imperil the 
years it is time to take another Castro regime. Without a Soviet benefactor, the 
approach. embargo actually has a chance to work. 
S The embargo alienates us from our America must stand up for human rights, political 
allies. Although it is designed to pluralism, and market economics even if our allies 
isolate Castro, the embargo has in do not. 
effect isolated the U.S .. 
6 Castro allowed the Pope to visit and Rapprochement with Castro has not worked in the 
has released political prisoners, he is past 
showing signs of mellowing. 
7 Lifting the embargo would strip The embargo is the only tool available to U.S. 
Castro of his final vestige of blame policy makers that can institute change in Cuba. 
for the U.S. and the Cuban people 
would realize that it has been Castro's 
economic policies, not the U.S., that 
has ruined Cuba. 
8 U.S. businesses are missing out on When Castro is gone and relations normalized, 
tremendous possibilities in Cuba. U.S. business will have a distinct advantage in 
Cuba based on proximity alone. It will take very 
little time before the U.S. is Cuba's largest trading 
partner. 
9 Castro has instituted economic Castro has not instituted any real steps toward 
reforms which undoubtedly will lead market liberalization or political reform. 
to political reform. The embargo 
makes Cubans more anti-American, 
thus more in favor of Castro, and 
stifles political dissent. 
10 Tourism and trade will raise Those who argue that contact with the West 
expectations in Cuba and bring about would help topple Castro neglect the fact that 
change. Foreign currency, especially Cubans are restricted from the areas where 
the dollar, is pervasive in Cuba. Western tourists visit. 
Other western ideals are permeating 
Cuban society. Lifting the embargo 




The United States should work toward lifting the embargo. While there are many 
valid concerns that this action will only serve to prop up Castro, the embargo has proven 
to be an inefficient means of coaxing change on the island. The embargo has in fact 
served to support Castro. U.S. policy on Cuba should be altered to be focused on the 





Migration. Here there is a historical precedent. There is great danger after Castro for 
chaos and mass migration to follow. Additionally, a 'reverse-migration' could ensue 
if the exile community is not taken into account. 
Countemarcotics. Cuba could easily become a transshipment point and money-
laundering spot (there is some evidence that Cuba is one now). We already have 
military commitments to work together in this arena but they should be expanded. 
Hemispheric trade and politics. Economically Cuba holds up the Free Trade of the 
Americas, and keeps the hemisphere from becoming fully democratic. 
Chaotic transition. Transition in Cuba could take many forms, if it is violent, it would 
likely draw in the U.S. military. 
The U.S. goal should be smooth, peaceful transition in Cuba - even ifin fact 
Castro hands the Cuban reigns over to a socialist successor. The truth is, without Castro, 
the Cuban revolution loses its preeminent institution. In a recent press briefing Secretary 
of State Madeline Albright noted that U.S policy "has been, and remains, to seek a 
peaceful transition to democracy .... Of course, we would like to see Castro embrace 
democracy. However, after 38 years, he appears as autocratic as ever - continuing to 
arrest political dissidents and exile others. Nevertheless, the Cuban people are beginning 
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to think beyond Castro. We need to do the same." 226 These remarks are extremely 
poignant because U.S. policy toward Cuba in the new millennium should entail two key 
elements mentioned by Albright, albeit in a bit different order:peaceful transition after 
Castro and an eventual transition to liberal democracy. 
1. Peaceful Transition 
> Work toward lifting the embargo. Political reality makes this difficult but not 
impossible. Our stance toward Castro and Cuba as a government that does not 
respect human or civil rights is not affected by lifting the embargo. In fact, we will 
gain greater credence in the international community by pressing for change in Cuba 
after the United States has become a part of the process. 
> Change Domestic Perception. The hard-line Cuban-exile community is in crisis. 
It lost their charismatic leader, Jorge Mas Canosa, and are introspective from the visit 
Qfthe Pope and his condemnation of the embargo. Changing perceptions throughout 
the Cuban-American community to a less radical line has never been more 
achievable. Changing domestic perception can make lifting the embargo easier. 
> Soften the Rhetoric and establish diplomatic ties. Take away Castro's key 
weapon against the U.S. by establishing relations. Recognize Cuba's sovereignty and 
virtues of revolution but highlight the lack of human rights, open markets, and 
political freedoms as a hindrance to Cuban citizens because of Castro's ideology. 
> Allay the Fears of all Cubans. Promise that there will be no U.S. threat to Cuba 
with Castro or without him. Ensure Cubans that Cuban exiles in the United States 
will not return to Cuba for their family's land and satisfy any and all claims of the 
exiled Cubans. Back up this promise with an appropriate legal framework. 
Interestingly, when Cuba and the United States have bi-annual meetings to discuss 
immigration issues, the Cuban delegation includes an attorney who, besides handling 
immigration, is the negotiator of the asset claim settlements with Canada, Spain, 
France, and other countries. According to Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, Cuba 
does this ')ust in case the United States wishes to discuss the issue ofthe certified 
claimants. "227 
2. Democratic Change Post-Castro 
> Alter political society quietly. Continue to condemn Castro's human rights record 
and lack of political plurality. Work through the Church and other human rights 
226 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Opening Remarks on Cuba at Press Briefing 
followed by Question and Answer Session by other Administration Officials Washington, D.C., March 20, 
1998. As released by the Office of the Spokesman U.S. Department of State. Available [Online] 
http://sccretary.state.gov!www!statcments!l998/980320.ht011 [4 May 1998]. 
227 Congress, House, Testimony of John Kavulich. 
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organizations that support non-communist organizations on the island. A stance from 
the international community will have a greater impact on the island than our current 
unilateral one. 
~ Target the military. The FAR is the single institution in Cuba strong enough to 
withstand U.S. assistance and is likely to be the key player in any transition. 
Continue with countemarcotics cooperation and migration accords. Institute new 
programs that will promote understanding toward each other's militaries: allow the 
Cuban's to monitor some of our military exercises, coordinate de-mining operations 
at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and allow military-to-military contacts on the island, 
in the United States, and at embassies throughout the world. 
~ Further the development of economic society. Continue to allow remittances and 
broaden U.S. business involvement in Cuba. Cubans already recognize U.S. 
trademarks as quality products and are eager to have U.S. business on the island. 228 
U.S. businesses are anxious to get into the Cuban economy as well. Working toward 
a market economy in Cuba will instill ideas of freedom and foster an environment for 
increased public access and involvement in the political process. 
~ Increase support to civil society. Since 1996, the U.S., through the Agency for 
International Development (USAID), has given grants totaling $2.1 million to Cuban 
NGOs.229 First, $2.1 million is a dismal figure for a nascent civil society. Second, 
support to Cuban civil society must come through NGOs such as the Church or 
through third-party countries such as Canada, Mexico, or Spain. The United States is 
still perceived as dangerous to Cuban organizations and our open governmental 
support can be counterproductive. 
By focusing on peaceful transition and helping to build institutions that further 
democratic ideals, U.S. policy toward Cuba can ensure our vital interest in promoting 
democracy, free markets, and peace in our hemisphere. Establishing diplomatic relations, 
helping to build democratic institutions, reaching out to potential key elements in a 
transition, and eventually lifting the embargo will help to ensure a secure future for the 
U.S. and for Cuba. 
228 John Kavulich, prepared speech on the Cuban Economy, Cuba Conference at the University of 
California at Berkeley, 20 March 1998. 
229 Michael Ranneberger Coordinator, Office of Cuban Affairs Remarks to the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science and the Right to Travel: Collaboration Between U.S. and 
Cuban Scientists Washington, DC, April 3, 1998Available [Online] 
http://www.state.gov!wwwipo!icYJcmarksiI998/980403_rannebergcr_us_cuba.html[4 May 4, 1998] 
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